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LEGAL ORIGINS, POLITICS,                                       
AND MODERN STOCK MARKETS 
Mark J. Roe
* 
Legal origin — civil vs. common law — is said in much modern economic work to 
determine the strength of financial markets and the structure of corporate ownership, 
even in the world’s richer nations.  The main means are thought to lie in how investor 
protection and property protection connect to civil and common law legal origin.  But, I 
show here, although stockholder protection, property rights, and their supporting legal 
institutions are quite important, legal origin is not their foundation. 
Modern politics is an alternative explanation for divergent ownership structures and the 
differing depths of securities markets in the world’s richer nations.  Some legislatures 
respect property and stock markets, instructing their regulators to promote financial 
markets; some do not.  Brute facts of the twentieth century — the total devastation of 
many key nations, wrecking many of their prior institutions — predict modern postwar 
financial markets’ strength well and tie closely to postwar divergences in politics and 
policies in the world’s richest nations.  Nearly every core civil law nation suffered 
military invasion and occupation in the twentieth century — the kinds of systemic 
shocks that destroy even strong institutions — while no core common law nation 
collapsed under that kind of catastrophe.  The interests and ideologies that thereafter 
dominated in the world’s richest nations and those nations’ basic economic tasks (such 
as postwar reconstruction for many) varied over the last half century, and these 
differences in politics and tasks made one collection of the world’s richer nations 
amenable to stock markets and another indifferent or antagonistic.  These political 
economy ideas are better positioned than legal origin concepts to explain the differing 
importance of financial markets in the wealthy West. 
INTRODUCTION 
Do legal origins — common law vs. civil law — largely determine 
whether capital markets develop strongly?  Many finance economists 
have concluded, in an explosion of influential articles in the past dec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  *  David Berg Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  Thanks for comments and, in four 
cases, research assistance on the data go to Michael Abramowicz, Marcelo Barbosa, Thorsten 
Beck, Robert Clark, John Coates, Christine Desan, Simeon Djankov, Charles Donahue, Antonio 
Duarte, Mel Eisenberg, Allen Ferrell, Martin Gelter, Patrick Glenn, Peter Gourevitch, Claudio 
Haddad, Peter Högfeldt, Howell Jackson, Rafael La Porta, Karl Lins, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Tamara Lothian, Bertrand du Marais, Dennis Mueller, Richard Pierce, John Pottow, Manoj 
Ramachandran, Mark Ramseyer, Stefano Rossi, Alvaro Santos, Frederick Schauer, Wendy Sheu, 
Bryan Shinn, Andrei Shleifer, Hölger Spamann, Lynn Stout, Guhan Subramanian, Marcelo Trin-
dade, Detlev Vagts, Agata Waclawik, Luigi Zingales, and those at workshops at the Columbia, 
Dalhousie, Duke, George Washington, Georgetown, Harvard, NYU, Pennsylvania, São Paulo, 
and Vanderbilt law schools, at the Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Harvard, IBMEC, and Stockholm 
business schools, and at the World Bank.  Thanks for research support go to Harvard Law 
School’s John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.  
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ade, that legal origin is indeed central.1  Common law institutions ef-
fectively protect outside shareholders, it is said; civil law ones do not.  
This differing legal capacity to protect outside shareholders explains 
why some rich nations’ capital markets are strong while others’ are 
weak. 
The stakes aren’t just academic.  The developing world and inter-
national agencies are told that “transplanting the correct legal code 
(i.e., the common law) will enhance economic development.”2  T h i s  
new legal origins view has in key circles elbowed aside the view that 
(1) economic function propels stock markets: stock markets develop 
when technology demands large enterprises and capital must be gath-
ered from many sources, and this process works when (2) policymakers 
or private players build the institutions that support stock markets and 
(3) have enough political support that the polity does not attack fi-
nance.  The last element — that national politics can confine policy-
makers’ institution-building — has increasingly found theoretical sup-
port and evidence.  Here I assess which approach — legal origin or 
political economy — is the better bet for future research and show 
how political and policy theories for the richer nations tie into system-
atic differences in how those nations experienced the turmoil of the 
early twentieth century.  Differences in corporate finance in the 
wealthy West in the second half of the twentieth century could well be 
due more to the differing consequences of the earlier World Wars than 
to subtle differences between civil and common law. 
There’s a powerful normative reason to get this assessment right.  
Many policymakers and some academics see strong financial markets 
as propelling economic development.3  Thus, if we better understand 
what makes for strong financial markets, we can better understand 
how to engineer economic growth, or at least how to provide a neces-
sary tool.  Important policymakers at international development agen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  1  See, for example, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998), and follow-on articles, some by these 
authors, many by others.  I cite a representative sample infra notes 2, 4–7.  For important con-
trary views, see infra section III.B, pp. 502–11. 
  2  Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Le-
gality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 166 (2003) (summarizing and criticiz-
ing the legal origins theory); see also Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 8 (1999).   
  3  See, e.g., THE STATE, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION 
(Richard Sylla et al. eds., 1999); Frederic S. Mishkin, Is Financial Globalization Beneficial?  3 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11891, 2005), available at http://www.nber. 
org/papers/w11891.pdf (“[T]he financial system is like the brain of the economy: it is a coordinat-
ing mechanism that allocates capital to building factories, houses and roads. . . . No work ethic 
can compensate for a misallocation of capital.”).  The contrary idea, that industrial structure calls 
forth finance, is associated with Joan Robinson.  See JOAN ROBINSON, THE RATE OF INTER-
EST AND OTHER ESSAYS 86 (1952) (“[W]here enterprise leads finance follows.”).  
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cies such as the World Bank — staffed with economists trained under 
the new thinking about legal origins’ centrality4 — denigrate civil law–
style institution-building, such as regulation, codification, and public 
enforcement.  Yet, by accepting the academic thinking positing the 
power of traditional common law tools, they may miss other needed 
tools not traditionally associated with the common law.  And if finan-
cial markets succeed only where there’s a supportive polity, then build-
ing the legal structures in the midst of a hostile polity would waste re-
sources and risk disappointment.  Development dollars would be 
better spent elsewhere. 
This is not to say that focusing on corporate law isn’t important.  It 
is.  But it is important in the right context.  The first-order condition is 
a polity that supports capital markets.  It’s only then that law becomes 
important and getting it wrong becomes costly.  Getting corporate law 
right in the United States is important and worthy of the attention it 
receives.  It is important here because the American polity supports 
capital markets.  In other nations — even wealthy ones like France, 
Germany, and Italy — the polity did not support capital markets in 
the immediate postwar decades.  When such a polity changes and be-
comes receptive to markets, especially capital markets, policymakers 
can make finance-friendly rules fall into place, and neither of the two 
major legal origins would much impede those rules from being effica-
cious.  Legal origin doesn’t stop a nation from developing the institu-
tions, legal and otherwise, that capital markets need.  When we see a 
nation that doesn’t do so, it’s not that its legal origin bars it.  Some-
thing else is in play. 
*  *  *  * 
Thus, the domain here is the wealthy West, and the problem to ex-
plain is why well-developed financial markets prosper in some nations 
and not in others.  The background idea — which I take for granted 
but some might question — is that greater financial possibilities for 
firms make economic growth easier.  If businesses cannot raise outside 
capital, that inability hinders economic development. 
So we must first understand the legal origins proponents’ views.  
How could legal origin affect finance?  One way, it’s been said, is that 
common law, by using fiduciary duties, better protects distant inves-
tors than civil law does.  This common law specialty can, in the hands 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  4  Cf. ASS’N HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRANCAIS, LES 
DROITS  DE  TRADITION  CIVILISTE  EN  QUESTION:  À  PROPOS  DES  RAPPORTS  DOING 
BUSINESS  DE  LA  BANQUE  MONDIALE  14–15 ( 2006),  available at http://henricapitant.org/ 
IMG/pdf/Les_droits_de_tradition_civiliste_en_question.pdf (describing the influence of legal ori-
gins thinking, especially in the World Bank).  
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of savvy judges and juries, be central, early thinking on the means of 
protection ran.  Further, later thinking runs, civil law systems over-
regulate the economy and stock markets, thereby stunting both, while 
common law institutions respect markets and private contracting.   
Getting either legal channel — protecting investors or respecting mar-
kets — wrong stymies financial development.  The handicap might be 
surmountable but is nearly hardwired into all too many legal systems, 
the theory runs.  The normative implication is that developing nations 
should seek those tools that work — like market-oriented private law-
suits decided by judges using common law–style fiduciary duties — to 
build markets.  And they conversely need to avoid those tools that do 
not work well — like too much rule-based regulation. 
In other words, the original creation of legal systems centuries ago 
created legal and decisionmaking structures that continue today to fa-
cilitate or impede market outcomes.  The civil law — by relying on 
codes, narrow judicial intervention, high regulation, and market direc-
tives instead of market solutions — impedes financial markets.  The 
common law — by relying on adaptive judges, wide judicial discre-
tion, light regulation, and private contracting — facilitates financial 
markets.  A corollary, often unstated, is that these tendencies to codify 
or not, to use a wide-ranging judicial style or not, to regulate intensely 
or not, and to prefer markets or not do not change easily once a legal 
system is in place.  Some characteristics might change at the edges, the 
theory might concede, but not enough to make a big financial differ-
ence.  These characteristics of the two major legal systems — seen to 
persist to this day in the legal origins theory — are strong enough to 
explain financial differences around the world.  Equally importantly, 
the theory views later influences on governmental structure — such as 
modern revolutions, civil wars, new constitutions, and deep social reac-
tions to economic and wartime devastation — as paling in conse-
quence to the structural predisposition wired into legal origin. 
Qualitative analysis, I argue, is at odds with the legal origins the-
ory.  It’s not that fiduciary duties are unimportant, but that even 
common law systems use regulators to protect minority stockholders.  
There are institutional substitutes.  And, although American judges in 
the nineteenth century restrained legislatures on economic matters, the 
modern era is one not of judicial restraints on economic regulation, but 
is instead one of legislative primacy.  We live in an age of statutes, as 
has been said.  Common law nations’ legislatures regulate; civil law 
nations’ legislatures regulate.  How legislatures choose to regulate re-
flects legislative policy decisions, voter preferences, and surely interest 
group power far more than it results from faded historical channels of 
legal origins that date back to Rome’s Empire, the Middle Ages, and 
Napoleon’s Code. 
Although many modern financial outcomes seem to correlate with 
legal origin, we know correlation is not causation.  For one thing, the  
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causative links offered thus far in legal origins theory are weak.  For 
another, legal origin in the wealthy West also correlates with other his-
torical characteristics, such as how Western nations experienced the 
early twentieth century’s wars and disruptions.  That modern history 
had powerful political economy consequences that deeply affected 
markets, financial and otherwise.  To buttress this alternative explana-
tion, I use the proponents’ method of quantifying national differences 
to show that twentieth-century history and politics explain financial 
differences as well as legal origin does and qualitatively link more 
strongly to outcomes than do origins.  In nations where legal origin 
originated, policy variables — the domain of legislatures and regula-
tors — strongly predict basic financial institutional facts.  Those policy 
differences seem more attuned to differences in postwar politics than 
to distant differences in legal origin.  For example, a risk-averse polity 
or one preoccupied with left-right conflict would not rebuild strong fi-
nancial markets with alacrity.  And remember that for the first decades 
after World War II, fighting communism was central to the domestic 
political agenda in much of Western Europe and East Asia.  This anti-
communist agenda alone strongly affected Western European and East 
Asian nations’ policies toward capital markets through the 1980s.  In 
fact, the differential impact of the World Wars and civil wars of the 
ugly early twentieth century generally packs as much explanatory 
power as legal origins in predicting the depth of late-twentieth-century 
financial markets in the wealthy West. 
*  *  *  * 
I describe in Part I the theories that link legal origin to financial re-
sults and bring to bear the legal academy’s views of the classical dif-
ferences between civil and common law.  First, common law systems 
simply regulate less, it’s said; they prefer market solutions and private 
contracting to centralized, statist regulation.  Second, the common law 
judge better protects outside financiers, especially minority stockhold-
ers, with common law–based fiduciary duties.  The civil law judge is 
in contrast hamstrung by a rigid code.  Third, because legal origin long 
preceded modern financial outcomes, markets could not have deter-
mined origin.  Because common law nations protect investors better 
than civil law nations, origin seems in the theory to cause deep finan-
cial markets.  But the correlation here seems more coincidental than 
causal.  The qualitative links between origins and investor protection 
seem weak, and without those links a linchpin in the theory is re-
moved, suggesting that a strong causal connection between civil law 
and weak financial markets just may not exist.  Many in the legal 
academy see the classical differences between civil and common law as 
not very important in modern economies, whose policy needs induce 
nations everywhere to regulate and codify.  Moreover, while common  
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law’s open-ended fiduciary duties have ex post strengths, civil law 
structures can, and do, use open-ended, ex post inquires as well; 
they’re just not labeled as fiduciary duties.  Common law systems just 
use them more.  And much stockholder protection in common law na-
tions comes from ex ante regulation (think of the American Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the massive codification of the securi-
ties rules through which the SEC works), which is not at the core of 
common law’s institutional advantage.  Again, the idea isn’t that law 
is unimportant but that once the first-order condition of political sup-
port for capital markets is reached, either origin can create the legal 
institutions that financial markets need. 
In Part II, I describe the twentieth-century shift in institutions 
around the world.  Regulation is everywhere; the legislature is su-
preme.  The common law judge’s import in economic policymaking 
has faded relative to that of the regulator.  It’s not just that we in the 
United States use both securities regulators and fiduciary duties but 
that we regulate financial markets more intensely than our civil law 
cousins do, as measured by regulatory budgets, personnel, and so on.  
And we often build up market-protecting devices via regulation: the 
American securities code is dense, specific, and detailed.  The function 
sought — protecting outside investors — thus can be achieved through 
multiple means, making the question not primarily one of legal tools 
but of political will.  The small legal structural differences that persist 
could readily be overcome by a determined polity. 
In Part III, I examine data.  While legal origin predicts securities 
market strength, a simple emblematic legislative policy does so just as 
well.  While one should be skeptical of many nation-by-nation regres-
sions because there aren’t enough relevant countries to run a sophisti-
cated statistical analysis, I nevertheless first examine the same set of 
twenty-seven nations whose financial differences proponents have said 
are driven by legal origin (and I then examine a larger set of coun-
tries).  I show that the financial contrasts can be just as well explained 
by the relative destruction of the richer economies in the first half of 
the twentieth century.  Some nations were destroyed; some survived.  
A few prospered.  Those that suffered the most had weaker financial 
markets than the others in the ensuing decades, even after they had 
otherwise recovered economically from the earlier destruction.  This 
correlation could be the basis for more compelling theories than distant 
legal origin, theories tied to modern political economy. 
In Part IV, I examine alternative theories emanating from modern 
politics.  The political economy approach looks at how political institu-
tions interact with preferences to create policy outcomes.  In the 
wealthy West, some legislatures haven’t wanted vibrant securities 
markets because their polities just would not support pro-market poli-
cies.  Post–World War II political issues — left-right labor politics, 
trade barriers, the median voter in nations whose capital stock had  
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been destroyed — are more promising roads than legal origin for re-
search seeking to explain financial outcomes.  For example, nations 
fighting communism internally and externally — and recall that this 
was the central agenda in Western Europe and East Asia in the dec-
ades after World War II — had reason to protect labor markets tightly 
and to ignore their capital markets.  They did so, often regardless of 
whether the government in power had a locally left-of-center or right-
of-center ideology.  A political economy approach is both simple be-
cause politics is more vital than legal origin, and complex because 
tracing which political theory works best overall will not be easy. 
I then conclude, summarizing the four new issues I here bring to 
the table.  First, a sustained analysis of the law-based literature on le-
gal origin shows both common and civil law nations’ increasingly us-
ing regulatory tools during the twentieth century.  Second, the avail-
ability of the classical tools associated with each legal origin is less 
important than whether a nation wants to build up capital markets.  
Third, political theories explain the differences in willingness to build 
up capital markets, with the political theories tying to variation in how 
nations experienced the first half of the twentieth century.  And finally, 
the development agencies’ reliance on common law’s core tools may 
thus be misguided. 
I.  CONSIDERING LEGAL ORIGINS 
That an important intellectual movement attributes much to legal 
origin is not in doubt.  Even the titles of articles assert legal origins’ 
centrality: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?5  Or just: Legal Origins.6  
But could origin, which to many legal academics seems just to be a 
technical aspect of judicial style, determine the strength of securities 
markets? 
With so many authors contributing to this literature, it’s hard — 
and potentially unfair — to summarize it.  Early movers’ views have 
evolved, emphasizing different institutional features than they did 
originally.  Not all players sign onto every idea others espouse.  But the 
idea that legal origin hardwires a national system in ways that are 
hard to overcome is out there and influential.  Here I summarize its 
major elements.7 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  5  Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?,  31 J.  COMP. 
ECON. 653 (2003).  This is one of the important articles associated with the World Bank.  
  6  Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002). 
  7  As said in an excellent recapitulation: “[D]ifferences in legal tradition cause differences in 
property rights.”  Ross Levine, Law, Endowments, and Property Rights 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11502, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11502.pdf.  
“La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny . . . argue that . . . legal origin . . . explains cross-
country differences in financial development.”  Menzie D. Chinn & Hiro Ito, What Matters for 
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A.  The Classic Differences 
First, what have legal scholars seen to be the classic, core differ-
ences between legal origins? 
The civil law codifies.  The Emperor Justinian had Roman law 
compiled and, when the compilation was completed in the year 533, 
barred future decisionmakers from referring to the work of judges and 
from citing authorities other than his Code.  All law was reflected in 
his  Corpus Juris Civilis, all else extraneous.8  Napoleon, seeking to 
control the judges in post-revolutionary France as the revolutionaries 
had sought in 1791 — by requiring judges, if the legislative text was 
ambiguous or silent, to ask the legislature its meaning — promulgated 
his famous Code.9  The common law, on the other hand, grows as 
judges decide cases and precedents evolve, without the judges’ refer-
ring to a central code.  A code centralizes authority; common law 
judges disperse it. 
Civil law and common law judges read the text of the governing 
code differently, it is said.  Civil law judges read its plain meaning; if 
the text is incomplete, it is said, a classic civil law judge does not fill in 
gaps where a common law judge would.10  Hence, the civil law judge 
deters insider corporate schemes ineptly, while the wily common law 
judge adapts and stops insider thievery.  Common law judges follow 
precedent, thereby building a cohesive system of law from the ground 
up.  Civil law judges, in contrast, do not follow prior opinions, often 
do not write down their reasoning, and do not tightly tie their deci-
sions to the facts of the case. 
The civil law tends toward deductive thinking — “to making plans, 
to regulating things in advance, . . . to drawing up rules and systema-
tizing them.”11  In contrast, “[t]he Englishman improvises, never mak-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11370,  2005) (emphasis added), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w11370.pdf;  see also J u a n  C .  B o t e r o ,  S i m e o n  D j a n k o v ,  R a f a e l  L a  P o r t a ,  
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor,  119 Q.J.  ECON.  1339, 
1340 (2004) (asserting that more than a country’s current politics, “the historical origin of a coun-
try’s laws shapes its regulation of labor and other markets”). 
  8  JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 6–7 (2d ed. 1985). 
  9  See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 263 (1968); MARY ANN GLENDON 
ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 67 n.1, 375–76, 378–79, 387 (2d ed. 1994) (“[T]he 
French royal courts[’] . . . resistance . . .  to all change . . . made them prime targets for revolu-
tionary wrath . . . .”); Beck et al., supra note 5, at 655, 657–58, 660.  Napoleon’s Code was also 
designed for nation-building, uniting disparate legal systems throughout France. 
  10  But cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION 3, 16–17, 23–25, 29–30 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (virtues of textualism). 
  11  KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 70 (Tony 
Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998) (1977).   
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ing a decision until he has to. . . . Only experience counts . . . and so he 
is not given to abstract rules of law.”12 
The civil law plans, the common law reacts. 
B.  Legal Origins and Financial Progress 
According to the legal origins theory, these contrasts between civil 
and common law systems induce differences in financial law, which 
lead to differences in financial outcomes. 
The first link between legal origins and financial markets is said to 
be how the legal system protects small investors.  “[C]ommon law 
countries protect shareholders better than do civil law countries and 
especially better than French civil law countries.”13  If small investors 
fear that insiders could rob them, they will not invest in the insiders’ 
firms.  If outsiders do not buy, then a deep stock market does not de-
velop, and the big owners — founding families and their successors — 
are locked in.14  Common law systems protect minority stockholders 
well via judge-made fiduciary duties,15 while civil law systems, the 
theory goes, are too rigid to protect minority stockholders.  As Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny (LLSV) wrote: 
[There’s a] ‘judicial’ explanation of why common law protects investors 
better than civil law . . . .  Legal rules in the common law system are usu-
ally made by judges, based on precedents and inspired by general princi-
ples such as fiduciary duty or fairness.  Judges are expected to rule on new 
situations by applying these general principles even when specific conduct 
has not yet been described or prohibited in the statutes.16 
And “these rules [protecting investors] vary systematically by legal     
origin.”17 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  12  Id. 
  13  Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595, 610 (2003). 
  14  The most precise model linking law to ownership diffusion does not tie the two via legal 
origin.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control 
23–30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203,  1999),  available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=203110. 
  15  See, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 22, 23–24, 
26 (2000).  Additionally, see Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 6, arguing: 
[Bright line rules] notoriously fail to catch undesirable conduct [concerning] the expro-
priation of investors by corporate insiders . . . .  [Bright line rules] do not work well in 
this area because a broad range of creative behavior designed to expropriate investors 
‘falls between the cracks’ in the rules . . . .  [C]ommon law regimes . . . do better than 
civil law in . . . investor protection . . . .  
Id. at 1222. 
  16  Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 9 
(2000).  
  17  Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).  This 
is a foundational article in the law and finance literature.  A deepening of the fiduciary duty ar-
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The second major explanation for financial differences between 
civil and common law economies is that civil law systems overregulate, 
killing securities markets before they can develop.  “[T]he state has a 
relatively greater role in regulating business in civil law countries than 
in common law ones.”18  Common law systems are more decentralized 
and less regulatory.  They facilitate the private, marketplace transac-
tions that allow securities markets to thrive.19 
If either channel is determinative — financial protection via com-
mon law fiduciary duties or an intrinsically overregulatory character of 
the civil law — then, a sympathetic commentator concludes, the impli-
cations of the legal origins work (and the commentator’s own) are that 
France and Italy “[should i]nstall a common law, adversarial legal sys-
tem and scrap their civil law systems.”20  Although strong medicine, 
it’s a natural conclusion here and not all that radical in the legal ori-
gins literature.  Key players do say that legal origin explains why some 
nations protect property, grow, and get rich.21 
So, could those differences in legal origin matter much for financial 
differences today in the wealthy West?  Not likely, I argue in the fol-
lowing sections.  The core differences could easily be exaggerated.  The 
answers lie somewhere else. 
1.  Protecting Minority Stockholders via Fiduciary Duties. —  At 
common law, fiduciary duties run from controlling insiders to outside 
shareholders.  Shareholders buy stock more comfortably when they 
know that a judge will protect them later from insider overreaching.  
Although hardly anyone thinks that legal protection is unimportant, 
the legal origins theory tries to go deeper: the common law — via its 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
gument — focusing on procedures to reduce self-dealing — can be found in Simeon Djankov et 
al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
11883, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=864645. 
  18  La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 12; Rafael 
La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 224 (1999). 
  19  Interesting recent legal origins papers propose a third channel — that common law nations 
intrinsically favor markets, transparency, and contract.  See, e.g., Djankov et al., supra note 17; 
Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta 
et al., What Works?].  Leaders in the legal origin debate may — as they turn to the overall prefer-
ence for market-friendliness — find themselves emphasizing political factors and forgetting about 
legal origins, particularly as some civil law nations move away from their post–World War II un-
ease with markets. 
  20  Dennis C. Mueller, The Economics and Politics of Corporate Governance in the European 
Union 28 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 37/2005, 2005) (em-
phasis added), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730366.  But, the author adds, mid-range re-
forms could help.  Id. 
  21  See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law, Endowments, and Finance, 
70 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 138 (2003).  Although not every legal origin proponent signs onto every 
idea held by every other legal origin proponent, the items quoted and summarized here are repre-
sentative, not outliers.  
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use of fiduciary duties — is structurally better suited to protect distant 
shareholders than civil law. 
The fiduciary duty channel for the legal origin theory has its weak-
nesses.  For one thing, the United States uses securities regulation as 
well as fiduciary duties to do the job.  And civil law nations could, 
were they so disposed, develop the institutions to protect minority 
stockholders.  Moreover, some scholars see the protections coming 
from the American common law judge as anemic22: one of the best 
known American corporate law articles, by William Cary, former chair 
of the SEC, was a rolling assault on judges’ unwillingness to protect 
distant minority stockholders.23  Take an example from the 1960s and 
1970s: Going-private transactions had insiders setting the price at 
which they bought out the public shareholders.  Many such transac-
tions were seen as scandalous, yet our courts let them go forward even 
though this problem — of controlling shareholders exploiting outside 
shareholders — is the type that can undermine a stock market.  The 
SEC criticized the courts and there were calls for new legislation — 
and commentators think that it was those threats, and not the common 
law evolving on its own, that induced the courts to toughen up on in-
siders.24  Another example: Earlier in the twentieth century, common 
law fiduciary duties were seen as weak enough to demand new federal 
regulation.  Insider trading, for example, was legal in most states at 
common law.25 
Thus, although common law fiduciary duties can be central in pro-
tecting shareholders, and often are in the United States, they’re not 
always as strong as they can be cracked up to be.26  Still, one has the 
impression that the United States uses fiduciary duties more than civil 
law nations (and maybe more than other common law nations).  The 
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  22  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1992) (arguing that states have 
weak incentives to produce good law dealing with “self-dealing transactions, taking of corporate 
opportunities, . . . insider trading,” and “regulation of going-private and parent-subsidiary freeze-
outs” — the very insider machinations that can quash a stock market). 
  23  William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Y ALE L.J. 
663, 670, 672, 681–84 (1974).  The contrary view is in Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Share-
holder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation,  6 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  251 ( 1977), and 
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 19–21 (1993). 
  24  See, e.g.,  RONALD  J.  GILSON  &  BERNARD  S.  BLACK,  THE  LAW  AND  FINANCE  OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 1254–56, 1256 n.40 (2d ed. 1995).  
  25  See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660–62 (Mass. 1933) (holding that without priv-
ity between insider directors and individual stockholders, an insider was not liable for trading on 
inside information, a result that left buyers in the stock market with reduced recourse — or none 
at all); WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW  OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 577–78 (2003).  The bright-line rules of section 16(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000), sufficed until the 1960s, when the SEC expanded insider trading liability. 
  26  See Bebchuk, supra note 22, at 1441.  
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critics could be seen as saying that American fiduciary duties should 
be even stronger — or that alone they do not protect investors enough. 
Indeed, common law, fiduciary-based protections get much help 
from regulators like the SEC, from the stock exchange, and from the 
legislature.  Yes, the American common law judge is, despite the crit-
ics, very important in corporate law, but the judge is not alone in pro-
tecting American stockholders.  And even if the common law judge 
were central — and not just very important — we’d need to know 
that regulators could not do the job as well before concluding that 
common law judging had an inherent structural advantage over the 
civil law in building financial markets.  Indeed, in Britain, the other 
major common law jurisdiction, the judge seems not to have protected 
minority stockholders well.27 
And much that’s important to shareholder protection isn’t driven 
by fiduciary duties.  Fiduciary duties do not protect distant stockhold-
ers from managerial mistake or from managers’ neglect of sharehold-
ers’ interests.  Because the business judgment rule stifles such lawsuits 
(properly, I might add), American stockholders must rely on other in-
stitutions to protect them from managerial error.  Thus, if uncon-
strained managers would be systematically less shareholder-oriented in 
some firms, or in some nations, than in others, then dominant share-
holders could not easily sell out their stock to distant stockholders be-
cause stockholder value would sharply decline.28 
Thus, if the common law–civil law distinction rested on basic fidu-
ciary duties, it would be weak: Yes, fiduciary duties have been impor-
tant to common law.  But modern American corporate law is not solely 
fiduciary oriented, but also made largely by the SEC, a regulator.  And 
the goal sought — protecting distant stockholders — can be achieved 
via multiple means, all within the reach of either legal origin.  It would 
be a mistake to read the qualitative evidence as telling us to prescribe 
mainly judge-based, fiduciary duty tools to propel financial and eco-
nomic development. 
2.  Overregulating Financial Markets. — John Coffee reinvigorated 
the legal origins theory, arguing that civil law overregulates securities 
markets.  Stock exchanges, if left alone, could protect stockholders.   
But statist, centralized civil law nations would not leave them alone, 
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  27  See Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the 
United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469–70 (2001) (importance of British stock exchange); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Sepa-
ration of Ownership and Control,  111 Y ALE  L.J.  1,  41–42 ( 2001)  (importance  of  British            
legislation).   
  28  I develop this idea in Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002), 
and in MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS  OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 159–96 
(2003).   
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stymieing stock markets from emerging and quashing private efforts to 
protect minority stockholders.  A low-regulation environment in the 
United States allowed the stock exchange to arise and to protect mi-
nority stockholders, and then exchange practices morphed into good 
securities law.29 
Finance scholarship took up Coffee’s overregulation theory30 and 
expanded it to posit a deep preference in common law nations for 
markets and private contracting.31  The overregulation hypothesis 
comes in three varieties: first, common law judiciaries confine the 
overregulatory tendencies of their legislatures; second, civil law sys-
tems overregulate securities markets; and third, the civil law intrinsi-
cally induces overregulation of the economy, while the common law 
lets markets flourish. 
With this third channel, origins theory ties into a system’s propen-
sity to adopt market-preferring, transparency-enhancing disclosure 
rules.32  Pro- or anti-market regulation is important, but attributing it 
to origin suffers from two limitations: First, we are now talking more 
about nations’ preferences for outputs — for (or against) markets, 
transparency, and private contracting — than about a legal system’s 
institutional qualities.  Stronger explanations for rival national prefer-
ences exist, as we see in Parts III and IV.  Second, both legal origins in 
modern times could go either way.  America passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002,33 which was quite directive,34 while Germany was 
setting up market-preferring, transparency-enhancing “comply or ex-
plain” rules, which did not impose regulatory straightjackets.35  A  
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  29  See Coffee, supra note 27, at 9.  Paul Mahoney argues that although legal origin does not 
affect corporate law, weak property protection in civil law nations stunts their economic growth.  
See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (2001). 
  30  See, e.g., Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 6, at 1194 (“French civil law countries exhibit heav-
ier regulation [and] less secure property rights . . . than do the common law countries.”); La Porta 
et al., The Quality of Government, supra note 18, at 231–32 (“[C]ivil legal tradition . . . build[s] in-
stitutions to further the power of the State . . . .”). 
  31  See, e.g., La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note 19, at 14, 28 (common law “emphasis on 
market discipline and private litigation”). 
  32  See id. at 27–28.  This channel is distinct from Coffee’s overregulatory channel. 
  33 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 
U.S.C.).   
  34  See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance,  114 Y ALE  L.J.  1521,  1529,  1594–1603 ( 2005) (severely criticizing the Act for being so             
directive). 
  35  See Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu Transparenz und Pulizität 
[Act in Furtherance of Transparency and Publicity of Corporate and Accounting Law], July 19, 
2002, BGBl. I at 2681, art. 1, § 161; BERICHT DER REGIERUNGSKOMMISSION CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE [Report of the German Government Panel on Corporate Governance] Rz. 8–10 
(Theodor Baums ed., 2001) (recommending “comply or explain” rules).  The effectiveness of these 
rules has yet to be seen.  See generally E. Wymeersch, The Enforcement of Corporate Governance 
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“comply or explain” rule instead requires a firm not following the rule 
to explain why it chose not to. 
As we see later, civil law nations’ heavy role in their economies is a 
twentieth-century phenomenon, not a longstanding one.  And, where it 
counts most here — for financial markets — by most measures com-
mon law nations regulate their securities markets, via codes and regu-
lators, more heavily than do civil law systems.  We pick up the over-
regulation thread again in Part II, but first let’s see how strong those 
classical differences between legal origins are today. 
C.  The Differences Erode 
The preceding section shows that classical differences probably did 
not determine financial differences in the first place.  Next we see that 
those classical differences do not sharply persist today for financial 
law. 
To be sure, what I call classical differences — civil law’s propensity 
to codify and its judiciary’s unwillingness to invent ways to remedy 
wrongdoing — are in dispute.  Civil law analysts see assertions of such 
differences as reflecting the prejudices of common law commentators, 
not the reality of their nations’ judicial institutions.36  But in this sec-
tion I take the classical differences — or prejudices — at face value 
and argue, first, that these differences were never powerful enough to 
determine deep divergences in financial markets (because both sys-
tems’ core tools can achieve the goal of investor protection) and, sec-
ond, that enough of these classical contrasts have eroded that whatever 
subtle differences persist cannot explain disparities in modern financial 
markets. 
First off, today both civil and common law regulate and codify.  
Consider Frederick Schauer’s evaluation: 
[E]ven in common law countries, the civil law model seems so much in the 
ascendancy, and the common law model seems so much in decline. . . . 
[Classic common law] open-ended lawmaking and rulemaking is now 
. . . rare, with detailed statutes and detailed regulations far more the norm 
now than in the past.37 
And how relevant are the classic differences to finance?  These dif-
ferences affected judicial action, not securities regulation — which is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Codes, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD. 113, 113 (2006) (describing them as the “best means of developing 
adaptive but nevertheless effective corporate governance practices”). 
  36  See, e.g., Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 333, 357–60 (1999).  But see Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common 
Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 87, 87–91 (1998). 
  37  Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 772 (2004).  
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where much of the action is for American financial markets.38  Indeed, 
more than thirty-five years ago, one general retrospective summarized 
the thinking then on legal origins: “there is no longer much difference 
between [the civil and the common law]”39 because the differences 
eroded in the twentieth century “by reason of the parallel [institutional] 
developments [in all nations] . . . to satisfy the same societal needs.”40 
Thus, first off, the modern state’s regulatory needs exceed the regu-
latory level that either the civil or common law tradition induced in 
prior centuries.  Modern socioeconomic similarities among the richer 
nations presumably pressed all affected nations toward new and 
roughly similar regulatory institutions. 
Second, civil law jurisprudence has adopted common law modes.  
Civil law countries no longer try to codify comprehensively.41  “The 
French Code of Commerce is now but an empty shell. . . . [I]t could 
not provide an adequate conceptual framework for the new institu-
tions which arose from the industrial revolution of the 19th century.”42 
True, civil law judges perhaps once refrained from implying duties, 
from looking at facts in a common law way, and from using precedent 
in a common law way, but these classic differences today are less stark 
than they once might have been.43  Modern civil law judges look at the 
functions of the legislation and interpret rules in light of function.   
They develop a shadow common law in key areas; although they tie 
their lawmaking to the legislative text, that text can have duty-type, 
open-ended standards, such as that of good faith.44  A “striking exam-
ple is Article 1382 of the French civil code, which simply says that 
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  38  Recent legal origin literature recognizes this, but hasn’t yet recognized in print how it can 
undermine the basic legal origins theory.  See, e.g., La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note 19, at 
15, 27–28. 
  39  Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 419, 434 (1967). 
  40  Id. at 420; see also Basil S. Markesinis, Learning from Europe and Learning in Europe, in 
THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE 1, 30–32 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., 1994); John Henry Merry-
man, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 357, 359 (1981) (finding more convergence than divergence).  Dainow fights the common 
conclusion that the two have lost many of their old differences, but he focuses on lawmaking in-
volving topics other than economic regulation.  See Dainow, supra note 39, at 434.   
  41  See MERRYMAN, supra note 8, at 155. 
  42  Denis Tallon, Reforming the Codes in a Civil Law Country, 15 J. SOC’Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 33, 
35 (1980).                             
  43  See Katja Funken, “The Best of Both Worlds”: The Trend Towards Convergence of the 
Civil Law and the Common System 14–16 (July 2003),  available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=476461.  Again, some civil law theorists say the differences never were so stark. 
  44  See Baudenbacher, supra note 36, at 347; Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordi-
nated and Liberal Market Economies 19 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working 
Paper No. 30/2005,  2005),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695763 (“[I]n Germany .  .  .  the 
good faith principle . . . has been widely used . . . and has allowed courts to develop extensive 
‘case law’ beyond the specific strictures of the civil code.”).   
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anyone causing damage to another by their fault must compensate for 
the damage.”45  From that open-ended legislative standard a law of 
torts emerged.46 
German corporate litigation further illustrates the modern civil law 
system’s interpretive capacity.  When a German corporation trans-
ferred assets to a subsidiary in a way shareholders disliked, a share-
holder sued.  The text of the German corporate code did not require 
that shareholders approve the transaction.  A legal origins analyst 
might have predicted that the civil law judge, lacking legislative guid-
ance, would not act, leaving the German shareholder unprotected. 
That’s not what happened.  The German court held that the trans-
fer hurt shareholders such that the shareholder assembly had to ap-
prove it.  The German court thus widened the zone of protection be-
yond the legislature’s words.47  The doctrine persisted, morphed, and 
adjusted.  The ensuing debate and judicial moves to define the scope 
of the doctrine look to me like the typical aftermath of a major Dela-
ware corporate law court decision.  True, whether German courts do 
this often enough and well enough still needs to be evaluated.  But 
they can and do use tools that resemble common law fiduciary duties. 
Third, and ironically here, the common law judge often feels ham-
strung by the legislative corporate rule — the very weakness attributed 
to the civil law judge.48  As William Bratton concluded: “With [Dela-
ware’s doctrine of independent legal significance], the state court effec-
tively announces that no body of substantive principles informs certain 
applications of the legislature’s corporate code, inviting transaction 
planners to exploit the literal word at will.”49  Textualist theories of 
common law jurisprudence, such as those associated with Justice 
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  45  H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 137 (2d ed. 2004); see also 
BASIL S. MARKESINIS, FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 90 (1997) (“[I]t is 
not the general clause [of the code] but the case law of the courts which produces the rules.”). 
  46  For this insight into a civil law judiciary’s capacity to work with open-ended legislation to 
build judge-made law, see Beck et al., supra note 5, at 658–59. 
  47  See Marc Löbbe, Corporate Groups: Competences of the Shareholders’ Meeting and Minor-
ity Protection — the German Federal Court of Justice’s Recent Gelatine and Macrotron Cases 
Redefine the Holzmüller Doctrine, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1057, 1057 (2004).  For another instance of 
expansive lawmaking in the civil law judiciary, see Baudenbacher, supra note 36, at 339–40, who 
notes how French courts create and expand product liability tort remedies.  But cf. Glaeser & 
Shleifer, supra note 6, at 1212 (“In civil law countries . . . judges are not even supposed to inter-
pret the codes very much . . . .”).   
  48  See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182 A.2d 22, 25–26 (Del. Ch. 1962), aff’d, 188 A.2d 123 
(Del. 1963) (Delaware court refusing to go beyond the terms of a statute to recognize a de facto 
merger). 
  49  William W. Bratton, Gaming Delaware, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 853, 854 (2004); see also 
D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 827 (2004).  But cf. Schnell v. Chris-Craft In-
dus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).  
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Scalia, are similar: common law judges should be hamstrung by legis-
lative words.50 
Fourth, common law systems have codified much of their financial 
law and thereby have become more regulatory.  Once it could be said 
that if the “common law stands for anything, it is absence of codes, 
and likewise civil law stands for codification.”51  But American re-
formers began codifying in 1892, with the Uniform Law Commission.  
“[T]he efforts of the [Uniform Laws] Conference have substantially 
promoted legal unification in the American states, especially in the 
area of commercial law . . . .”52  Since the 1950s, the United States has 
had a Uniform Commercial Code.  Since 1923, the American Law In-
stitute has been recapitulating, in code-like form, American law.  “[The 
ALI’s] Restatements are rather like the Civil Law codes in their sys-
tematic structure of abstractly formulated rules . . . .”53  And common 
law codes are often more detailed than civil law codes, leaving less dis-
cretion for the common law judge.54 
Moreover, codification here wasn’t inimical to markets.  Business 
interests often wanted it, as they thought the common law confusing, 
giving the legal profession too much power to extract rents in business 
transactions.55  The legal profession, not business interests, resisted 
codification.  Indeed, a strong tradition of legal theorists concludes that 
ex ante precise codification yields better predictability for business 
than ex post judicial general decisionmaking.  Jeremy Bentham is the 
classic critic of the common law on this score: “In his view, the funda-
mental evil was the common law that had evolved over hundreds of 
years. . . . It was unclear, uncertain, and full of fictions and tautologies; 
the judiciary was slow and unjust.”56    Bentham  recommended      
codification. 
Indeed, imagine an inquiry into why secured credit and securitiza-
tion are so strong in the United States.  One would bump into article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code — a code so richly drafted that it 
leaves little interpretive discretion for the judge.  One might then hy-
pothesize that it’s the American capacity to codify in detail that facili-
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  50  See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 16–17, 23–25, 29–30. 
  51  R.C.  VAN  CAENEGEM,  JUDGES,  LEGISLATORS  AND  PROFESSORS:  CHAPTERS  IN 
EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 39 (1987); see also F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS 
AT THE CIVIL LAW 47 (1953).  
  52  ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 11, at 252 (emphasis added).   
  53  Id.  The Restatements are not themselves law.  The uniform codes become law when           
enacted.  
  54  See id. at 267–68 (discussing English codes). 
  55  See Donald J. Smythe, Transaction Costs, Contagion Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uni-
form Sales Act, 1906–47, at 5 (July 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=799324. 
  56  Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 Y ALE 
J. INT’L L. 435, 476 (2000).  
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tates secured credit and securitization.  One might hypothesize that 
regulatory codification plays a similar role for American securities law. 
Although early codifications systematized common law decisions, 
“the new statutes [have] frequently [been] meant to be the primary 
source of law.  Courts, limited to honest interpretations of these stat-
utes and committed to legislative supremacy, . . . [gave] them the au-
thority they claimed for themselves.”57  It may be an exaggeration to 
say that the real difference between the Napoleonic Code and Ameri-
can codification is that the former just predated the latter — but we’re 
all codifiers now. 
Indeed, much American corporate law is codified in the 1933 and 
1934 Securities Acts,58 their major legislative amendments such as the 
Williams59 and Sarbanes-Oxley Acts, and the SEC’s regulatory imple-
mentation.  Many American corporate lawyers do not decipher fiduci-
ary duty cases, but instead apply the detailed rules of the SEC’s Regu-
lation S-K.60 
Remaining big differences between civil and common law lie in the 
civil law’s penchant for formalism, in the nature of the trial, and in 
the availability of a jury61 — differences unlikely to affect finance 
deeply.  Commercial interests in the United States at times opt for 
formal rules, preferring their relative certainty.62  Although the civil 
law often does not use the jury common in the United States, our pri-
mary corporate law court — that in Delaware — operates without a 
jury, with this seen as one of its advantages.63 
*  *  *  * 
Legislatures in common law countries today regulate.  They tell 
administrative agencies to write the rules to implement the legisla-
ture’s general instructions, thereby reducing the relative import of the 
courts.  What counts today is not method but content — that is, policy.  
And, to the extent policy does not flow from the pens of regulators 
promoting the public welfare, it’s politics. 
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  57  GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982) (emphasis 
added).  Judge Calabresi critiques judicial deference.  
  58  15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000). 
  59  15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)–(e), § 78n(d)–(f) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). 
  60  17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.702 (2006). 
  61  See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 11, at 272–74.  
  62  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769–70 (1996).  
  63  See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 679, 708 (2002).  English civil courts also typically operate without a jury.  See 
NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE 775 (2003) (“The jury has been excluded from 
the great majority of civil cases . . . [due] notably [to] the need for consistency and predictability.”).    
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D.  Can Legal Origin Anchor Law as the Primary Cause? 
Important to the legal origins inquiry is how origin could buttress 
the centrality of corporate law in creating financial markets.  That is, 
even if we regularly saw “good” corporate law in countries with deep 
stock markets and “bad” corporate law in countries without them, we 
wouldn’t know which caused what.  Do financial markets mostly arise 
for economic reasons and then players in those markets insist on pro-
tective law? 
 
FIGURE 1.  ASSOCIATION COULD INDICATE 
BIDIRECTIONAL CAUSATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal origins theorists argue that good on-the-ground corporate 
law and good financial outcomes are both found in common law na-
tions and the opposite in civil law nations.  Because origins long pre-
ceded modern markets, markets could not have caused legal origin, as 
Figure 1 illustrates.  Origin causes good (or bad) financial law, the the-
ory runs, and then that financial law makes markets flourish (or not), 
as Figure 2 shows. 
 
FIGURE 2.  THE LAW AND FINANCE, LEGAL ORIGINS VIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Law largely determines finance outcomes.  Because origin and types of 
rules correlate, causation is largely from rules to finance, not vice 
versa. 
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If the sequence in Figure 2 breaks down, the case strengthens for 
other explanations of why and how law and financial markets interact.  
Law, economic task, and politics might well be determined simultane-
ously.  And, if that sequence breaks down far enough, as I argue it 
must, then a persisting line of academic explanation for strong finan-
cial markets could be incorrect and a persisting line of development 
efforts misguided. 
*  *  *  * 
That’s the legal origins theory and some of its explanatory weak-
nesses.  In the rest of the Article I further argue against it, show that 
twentieth-century history can explain the data as well as or better than 
medieval legal origins, and conclude that the big-picture inquiry 
should now put aside legal origins and focus on how economic func-
tion interacts with policymakers’ political motivations and constraints. 
The basic political economy story is simple: First, the classic differ-
ences between legal origins are easily exaggerated.  What counts is 
whether the system can protect investors; either set of tools can be de-
ployed to do the job.  Second, modern securities law revolves around a 
regulatory agency operating through a comprehensive regulatory code 
— not an intrinsic common law institutional advantage.  What counts 
is not the tool but the polity’s willingness to tolerate financial markets.  
Third, all modern states regulate the economy much more than either 
legal origin would induce.  Legislatures legislate and regulators regu-
late in both systems.  What counts is what the legislature legislates: 
whether it protects or denigrates property rights and capital markets.  
The legislature and its regulatory creations are central today in defin-
ing economic rights, but it’s the judiciary that defines legal origins   
differences. 
The legal origins literature has pushed us to think more deeply 
about how institutions and markets relate.  But it may be modern po-
litical economy issues and not origins that drive institutional differ-
ences in the wealthy West.  Differences between civil and common law 
are mostly ones of judicial style, but legal origin has become bundled 
in too many people’s minds with substantive regulations, with regula-
tors’ ideological tendencies, and even with voters’ preferences — 
which are mostly modern political economy variables with which ori-
gins ought not to be bundled. 
The effects of the early twentieth century’s cataclysms were proba-
bly more powerful than classical features of judicial style and legal 
origin.  Even among nations where securities markets had once been 
strong, where devastation and instability were relatively greater from 
1914 to 1945, securities markets were shallower at the end of the twen-
tieth century.  The core civil law countries were wrecked more severely 
than the core common law countries, as the latter were separated by  
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oceans and channels from the twentieth century’s bloodiest battle-
fields.  The consequences were not small.  Common law nations’ insti-
tutions survived more or less intact; the core civil law nations’ institu-
tions were wrecked and then rebuilt in the post–World War II political 
environment, one in which they did not strongly prefer financial mar-
kets.  Some nations denigrated stock markets, protected labor markets, 
and had the state allocate capital; others did not.  These differences set 
the modern foundations for differing financial structures in the 
wealthy West — not legal origin. 
II.  STATE POWER AND LEGAL ORIGIN 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
I focused in Part I on the weakness of the fiduciary duty argument, 
the growing importance of codification in both legal systems, and the 
general rise of regulatory agencies.  I focus in this Part on the histori-
cal trends in civil and common law countries of state presence in their 
economies. 
First, although there are differences in the weight of the state 
among the world’s wealthiest nations, these differences historically did 
not break sharply along origins lines.  Second, variation around the 
world today in regulatory budgets for finance does not fit a neat legal 
origins dichotomy: it’s the common law nations that spend more on fi-
nancial regulation. 
One view that’s come up — that the common law confines state 
power — should be put aside.  Some origins advocates see common 
law institutions restraining governmental power and protecting prop-
erty: “[T]he common law historically stood on the side of private prop-
erty owners against the state.  Rather than becoming a tool of the state, 
the Common law has acted as a powerful counterbalance that has 
promoted private property rights.”64  The better view, as I see it, is 
that the common law is, or can be, such a “tool of the state.”  Property 
owners long dominated the state in Britain65 (and perhaps the United 
States), inducing it to protect property via common law judges; if the 
judges had not protected property owners, the owners would have 
found other institutions to protect themselves, inducing their Parlia-
ment to enact a code if need be. 
It’s true that a long time ago American courts barred state legisla-
tures from demeaning preexisting property rights in what’s often called 
the Lochner era, named after the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  64  Beck et al., supra note 5, at 658 (emphasis added).  
  65  See B ARRINGTON  MOORE,  JR., SOCIAL  ORIGINS  OF  DICTATORSHIP  AND  DEMOC-
RACY 19 (1966).  
2006]  WAR VS. LEGAL ORIGIN  483 
same name.66  And Congress’s own capacity back then to make eco-
nomic law was more limited than today.  The Constitution does not 
grant full economic sovereignty over the United States to Congress, 
whose formal power comes from clauses like the Commerce Clause,67 
which gives it power to regulate interstate commerce.  That power was 
originally seen as narrower in scope than it became later in the twenti-
eth century.  Here and there at the end of the nineteenth century, Con-
gress used its commerce authority to regulate the railroads or to pass 
antitrust laws for firms in interstate commerce.  But until the early 
twentieth century, the interstices were not all that porous.68  (Strictly 
speaking, common law is not even the impetus here.  The Supreme 
Court was sitting not as a common law court but as a constitutional 
one.  Nor is judicial restraint on legislative economic power inherent in 
the common law.  British courts did not analogously confine Parlia-
mentary authority.69  In Britain “there are no special, ‘fundamental’ 
laws that cannot be abolished or changed by Parliament.”70  S o m e  
even see democratic lawmaking in the United States as the key to 
property protection, with judicial review secondary.71) 
Moreover, the logic linking property and finance in this channel of 
the legal origins theory is not so clear cut.  Property rights protect the 
investor against the state’s encroachments.  A nation could strongly 
protect property from state incursion but poorly protect outside inves-
tors from insider machinations — and vice versa. 
The common law judge — or at least its constitutional law avatar 
— is still a powerful figure in American lawmaking.  But we should 
not mistake the judge’s centrality in some spheres for an importance in 
spheres in which the judge has become a lesser figure.  The American 
judge draws boundaries for lawmakers on social policy issues, such as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  66  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-2, -4, at 1344, 1350 (3d ed. 2000); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE 
LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 152–54 (1998). 
  67  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
  68  See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM, at x (1987) 
(“[A] ‘dual federalism’ . . . prevent[ed] both state and federal regulation of industry.”).  Some legal 
origins analysts understand well the limited role common law courts play in controlling congres-
sional legislation.  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. 
ECON. 445, 447 (2004) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has long accepted the government’s power to 
tax and regulate .  .  .  .”).  The next step is to grapple with the political forces that affect                         
legislatures. 
  69  See J EFFREY  GOLDSWORTHY,  THE  SOVEREIGNTY  OF  PARLIAMENT  10,  235 ( 1999); 
Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development 31 (Univ. of Chi., John M. Olin Law 
& Econ. Working Paper No. 287, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=892030.  
  70  VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 51, at 20. 
  71  See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 139–40 (1995); Daniel H. Cole, 
Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analy-
sis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 51, on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library).  
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abortion, affirmative action, and gay rights, not rights to property pro-
tection.72  The modern regulatory state, although subject to judicial in-
terpretations of what authority the legislature gave the regulator, is de-
fined more by the legislature — not a common law institution — than 
by the judiciary. 
A.  The Rise of the Regulatory State in the Twentieth Century 
State presence in common law systems today exceeds its historical 
presence in civil law nations.  Historians often mark World War I as a 
turning point: old governmental structures collapsed just after the War, 
statist institutions emerged, people demanded more from their gov-
ernments, and the welfare state grew.  Nations transformed themselves 
into administrative states that act primarily through statutes, direc-
tives, and regulation. 
The United States began moving away from judge-made law, and 
even away from legislatively made but judicially enforced law, well 
over a century ago when Congress set up the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and chose to have regulators, not judges, make law.73  
The New Deal was built on these regulatory beginnings, when the 
Lochner-era skepticism towards administrative regulation and positive 
government ended.74  Courts’ “uncoordinated, decentralized structure 
made them ill suited to undertaking” modern social and economic re-
form.75  “[T]hey could not even begin proceedings on their own [and] 
were rarely experts in the matter at hand.  As a result, the New Deal 
period saw a large-scale movement away from the courts [toward 
regulators and the legislature] as a system of social ordering.”76  “[W]e 
have gone from a legal system dominated by the common law, divined 
by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have be-
come the primary source of law.”77 
As a leading political scientist said two decades ago: “Congress in-
variably [now] chooses to regulate economic . . . life by creating agen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  72  One newspaper’s list of milestones in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s thirty-three year term was 
dominated not by economic issues but rather by those of federalism, jurisdiction, the separation of 
church and state, civil rights, abortion, the death penalty, and flag burning.  See Significant Cases 
in a 33-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A19.  When the Court recently ruled on prop-
erty-taking powers, it deferred to legislative power.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 
2655, 2663 (2005).  Several states shortly thereafter seemed poised to restrict local governments’ 
power to take local property for economic development.  See Christopher Cooper, Court’s Emi-
nent-Domain Edict Is a Flashpoint on State Ballots, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2006, at A4.  The pol-
ity, not the judges, restricts takings. 
  73  See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administra-
tive Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 35–40 (1982). 
  74  See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).   
  75 C ASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 61 (1993). 
  76  Id. 
  77  Id. at 1.  
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cies . . . .  Congress [usually] delegates power to regulatory agencies in-
stead of passing laws and allowing the courts to oversee their enforce-
ment.”78  Primary economic matters — such as the structure of finan-
cial markets — are not left for the common law judge to resolve. 
Modern political science often extols the virtues of administrative 
over judge-made law: if economic regulation depended primarily on 
the judiciary, we’d face delay, inconsistency, and sporadic action, since 
courts must wait for a controversy to come before them.79  Common 
law institutions aren’t up to dealing with many modern economic 
problems.  This view — that we’re all regulators now — is deep, per-
sistent,80 and, in my view, inconsistent with legal origins theory. 
B.  The Power of the State 
Data show the regulatory state rising in both civil and common law 
nations, with the divergence in state role between the two a modern 
phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  78  Fiorina, supra note 73, at 33, 35. 
  79  Id. at 43; see also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4 
(1988) (showing that courts are passive, equipped to decide only discrete controversies). 
  80  See, e.g., ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 5–
7 ( 1941); GABRIEL  KOLKO,  RAILROADS  AND  REGULATION  1–6,  231–39 ( 1965) (noting that 
Progressives and the railroad industry alike wanted railroad regulation in light of their unhappi-
ness with common law institutions); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 24 
(1938).  Proponents of a regulatory capture tradition suspect that such regulation often results 
from the deleterious influence of interest groups.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 350–51 (1974); George J. Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4–6, 17–18 (1971).   
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TABLE 1.  GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT, 1870–1996 (GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP)81 
 
Country 
Legal 
Origin 
About 
1870 
Pre-WWI 
(1913) 
Post-WWI 
(1920) Pre-WWII  1996 
Austria Civil  10.5  17.0  14.7  20.6  51.6 
Belgium Civil  n.a.  13.8  22.1  21.8  52.9 
France Civil  12.6  17.0  27.6  29.0  55.0 
Germany Civil  10.0  14.8  25.0  34.1  49.1 
Italy Civil  13.7  17.1  30.1  31.1  52.7 
Japan Civil  8.8  8.3  14.8  25.4  35.9 
Netherlands Civil  9.1  9.0  13.5  19.0  49.3 
Norway Civil  5.9  9.3  16.0  11.8  49.2 
Spain Civil  n.a.  11.0  8.3  13.2  43.7 
Sweden Civil  5.7  10.4  10.9  16.5  64.2 
Switzerland Civil  16.5  14.0  17.0  24.1  39.4 
Australia Common  18.3  16.5  19.3  14.8  35.9 
Canada Common  n.a.  n.a.  16.7  25.0  44.7 
Ireland Common  n.a.  n.a.  18.8  25.5  42.0 
New Zealand  Common  n.a.  n.a.  24.6  25.3  34.7 
United Kingdom  Common  9.4  12.7  26.2  30.0  43.0 
United States  Common  7.3  7.5  12.1  19.7  32.4 
Civil  10.3  12.9  18.2  22.4  49.4 
Common  11.7  12.2  19.6  23.4  38.8  Average  
Overall  10.7  12.7  18.7  22.8  45.6 
 
1.  A Timeline of State Power in the Twentieth Century. —  Gov-
ernment spending was low in both civil and common law nations at 
the end of the nineteenth century and higher in both at the end of the 
twentieth.  Government spending in every civil law nation in 1870 and 
1913 was well below spending in the common law nations in the late 
twentieth century.  Common law governments spent about the same as 
civil law nations — or more — before World War I. 
True, government spending imperfectly indicates state power: the 
state can bar an activity without spending much.  We cannot perfectly 
measure state power, but the numbers suggest that civil law does not 
compel high state presence in the economy.  Before World War I, civil 
law governments had modest roles in their economies82 and were often 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  81  Based on VITO  TANZI  &  LUDGER  SCHUKNECHT,  PUBLIC  SPENDING  IN  THE  20TH 
CENTURY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 6–7 tbl.I.1 (2000).  Even clipping off the two countries 
with the highest expenditures in 1870 — Australia and Switzerland — maintains the rough 
equivalence, with the ratio of common law countries’ spending to civil law countries’ spending 
staying close to 1 in 1870.   
  82  See HAROLD JAMES, EUROPE REBORN 48 (2003) (“[Before World War I] there was a sub-
stantial level of [economic] integration, with large flows of goods, capital and labor that were 
largely unaffected by national control and regulation . . . .  Property rights were secure and widely 
understood as a basis of civilization.”).  
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politically conservative.  Their budgetary domination of their econo-
mies is a late-twentieth-century phenomenon, not a centuries-old one. 
 
TABLE 2.  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND TRANSFERS, 1870–1995 
(AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP)83 
 
Country 
Legal 
Origin 
About 
1870  1937  1960  1970  1980  1995 
Austria Civil  n.a.  n.a.  17.0  16.6  22.4  24.5 
Belgium Civil  0.2 n.a.  12.7  20.7  30.0  28.8 
France Civil  1.1  7.2  11.4  21.0  24.6  29.9 
Germany Civil  0.5  7.0  13.5  12.7  16.8  19.4 
Italy Civil  n.a.  n.a.  14.1  17.9  26.0  29.3 
Japan Civil  1.1  1.4  5.5  6.1  12.0  13.5 
Netherlands Civil  0.3 n.a.  11.5  29.0  38.5  35.9 
Norway Civil  1.1  4.3  12.1  24.4  27.0  27.0 
Spain Civil  n.a.  2.5  1.0  6.7  12.9  25.7 
Sweden Civil  0.7 n.a. 9.3  16.2  30.4  35.7 
Switzerland Civil  n.a.  n.a.  6.8  7.5  12.8  16.8 
Australia Common  n.a.  n.a.  6.6  10.5  16.7  19.0 
Canada Common  0.5  1.6  9.0  12.4  13.2  14.9 
Ireland Common  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  18.8  26.9  24.8 
New Zealand  Common  0.2 n.a. n.a.  11.5  20.8  12.9 
United Kingdom  Common  2.2  10.3  9.2  15.3  20.2  23.6 
United States  Common  0.3  2.1  6.2  9.8  12.2  13.1 
Civil  0.7  4.5  10.4  16.3  23.0  26.0 
Common  0.8  4.7  7.8  13.1  18.3  18.1  Average 
Overall  0.7  4.6  9.7  15.1  21.4  23.2 
 
  2.  Timelines of Government Budgets, Government Transfers, and 
Financial Markets. — Nor do civil law nations historically show a 
higher propensity than common law nations to redistribute income, 
wealth, or property.  Table 2 shows no big difference between the size 
of government subsidies and transfers in common and civil law na-
tions at the end of the nineteenth century.  Two trends emerge from 
Table  2: First, subsidies and transfers increased throughout the devel-
oped world over the past century.  Second, civil law nations did not 
redistribute noticeably more than common law nations until the latter 
part of the twentieth century — and often distributed less.  The num-
bers for the end of the nineteenth century are consistent with many 
civil law nations being conservative, property-oriented regimes. 
Moreover, stock and other financial markets were stronger in civil 
law nations before World War I than after World War II, as Table 3, 
drawn from Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales’s data, shows.  The 
fraction in each cell in Table 3 is the total value of the nation’s stock 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  83  Based on TANZI & SCHUKNECHT, supra note 81, at 31 tbl.II.4.  
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market as a percentage of its gross domestic product.  Back in 1913, 
several core civil law nations’ stock markets — those of Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Sweden — were stronger than America’s.  Be-
tween  1913 and 1970, stock market capitalization declined in most 
wealthy civil law nations while it increased in most wealthy common 
law nations.  By 1970, the trend in the civil law nations reversed, and 
every nation’s stock market capitalization rose; by 1999, civil and 
common law nations again began to look similar. 
The data in Tables 1, 2, and 3 suggest that something happened in 
the twentieth century that pushed civil and common law nations — 
once seemingly on a similar financial path — to diverge sharply after 
World War II, with that divergence fading at the end of the century. 
 
TABLE 3.  STOCK MARKETS FROM 1913 TO 1999 (STOCK MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP)84 
 
Country Legal  Origin  1913  1960  1970  1999 
Belgium Civil  0.99 0.32  0.23  0.82 
Denmark Civil  0.36 0.14  0.17  0.67 
France Civil  0.78 0.28  0.16  1.17 
Germany Civil  0.44 0.35  0.16  0.67 
Italy Civil  0.17 0.42  0.14  0.68 
Japan Civil  0.49 0.36  0.23  0.95 
Sweden Civil  0.47 0.24  0.14  1.77 
Switzerland Civil  0.58 n.a.  0.50  3.23 
Australia Common  0.39 0.94  0.76  1.13 
Canada Common  0.74 1.59  1.75  1.22 
United Kingdom  Common  1.09 1.06  1.63  2.25 
United States  Common  0.39 0.61  0.66  1.52 
Civil  0.54  0.30  0.22  1.25 
Common  0.65  1.05  1.20  1.53  Average 
Overall  0.57  0.57  0.54  1.34 
 
3.  Regulating Financial and Labor Markets. — Strands of the legal 
origins theory say that it’s the density and intensity of regulation in 
civil law systems that’s important.  Civil law systems lay on too much 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  84  Based on Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Fi-
nancial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 15 tbl.3 (2003).  Their data 
don’t account for float — the portion of stock not owned by the controlling insiders.  Float could 
be high or low with the same stock market capitalization.  Overall, this kind of historical stock 
market data is often uncertain.  Recalculating the 1913 numbers with a data source economic his-
torians prefer suggests that Table 3 understates the size of America’s stock market and overstates 
Britain’s.  See Richard Sylla, Schumpeter Redux: A Review of Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zin-
gales’s Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 391, 401 (2006) (using data from 
RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, COMPARATIVE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEETS 233, 301 (1985)).  
Such adjustments, though, wouldn’t change the rough similarity of stock market capitalization in 
1913 of common law and civil law nations.  See G OLDSMITH, supra, at 199, 209–10, 217–18, 
225–26, 249–50, 255–56, 289–90.  
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rigid securities regulation and thereby demean securities markets.85  
They do the same with labor regulation, thereby making labor markets 
rigid.86  It was just a matter of time before their robust 1913 stock 
markets collapsed under the weight of overregulation. 
But the data do not show this for securities regulation.  Many of 
the same nations that hardly regulate securities markets regulate labor 
markets intensely, creating the well-known labor rigidities in Continen-
tal Europe.87  The policy tool — regulation — is there, but it is used to 
protect incumbent labor, not shareholders.  The policies differ; the tool 
does not. 
 
TABLE 4.  LABOR AND SECURITIES DISCLOSURE REGULATION 
NEGATIVELY CORRELATE IN THE OECD88 
 
Nations with high stockholder rights  Nations with low stockholder rights 
Country 
Disclosure 
Regulatory 
Intensity 
Labor 
Regulation  Country 
Disclosure 
Regulatory 
Intensity 
Labor 
Regulation 
United States  6.0 0.48  Norway  3.5 1.33 
Canada  5.5 0.46  Sweden  3.5 1.28 
United Kingdom  5.0 0.47  Mexico  3.5 1.17 
France  4.5 1.41  Denmark  3.5 0.99 
South Korea  4.5 0.99  Spain  3.0 1.33 
Japan  4.5 0.79  Netherlands  3.0 1.19 
Australia  4.5 0.72  Finland  3.0 1.06 
Italy  4.0 1.28  Turkey  3.0 0.88 
Switzerland  4.0 0.87  Portugal  2.5 1.46 
Ireland  4.0 0.81  Germany  2.5 1.31 
New Zealand   4.0 0.41  Belgium  2.5 0.94 
     Greece  2.0 1.00 
     Austria  1.5 0.86 
Average in high 
disclosure 
nations 
4.6  0.79 
Average in low 
disclosure 
nations 
2.8  1.14 
     Overall 
average  3.6  0.98 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  85  See Coffee, supra note 27, at 9–10. 
  86  See Botero et al., supra note 7, at 1339, 1375–80. 
  87  See Gilles Saint-Paul, The Political Economy of Employment Protection, 110 J. POL. ECON. 
672,  696–99 ( 2002); Horst Siebert, Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment in 
Europe, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 39 (1997).   
  88  The labor regulation index combines an employment index and an industrial relations in-
dex.  Employment measures the direct cost to a firm of firing a worker, the procedures needed to 
dismiss workers, the cost of overtime, and the ease of hiring part-time workers.  Industrial rela-
tions measures union power (based on how easy it is to unionize and whether employers must 
bargain with unions) and the strength of the right to strike.  Botero et al., supra note 7, at 1348–49 
tbl.1, 1353–56, 1362–63 tbl.3.  Securities disclosure regulation measures whether a nation’s securi-
ties law requires that a sales prospectus be delivered to buyers disclosing insider compensation, 
inside ownership, the issuer’s ownership structure, and the details of any insider dealings with the 
issuer.  La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note 19, at 6 tbl.1, 15–16 tbl.II.  
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  Several polities protect the marginal blue-collar worker more than 
the marginal stockholder.  Consider Table 4, which lists measures of 
securities market regulation and labor market regulation in the wealth-
ier nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.  Labor market regulation is intense in some nations, 
weak in others.  But intense labor market regulation does not go along 
with intense securities market regulation.  They correlate negatively.89 
That contrast — civil law regulating labor markets intensely and 
capital markets lightly — meshes awkwardly with a theory that civil 
law overuses regulatory tools.  It is also hard to make a case that civil 
law is intrinsically pro-labor and anti-capital, given that civil law na-
tions’ nineteenth-century politics were anti-labor.90  France outlawed 
labor unions from 1791 to 1884 and barred strikes until 1864.91  Ger-
many banned or restrained labor unions during most of the nineteenth 
century, most famously in its (anti-) Socialist Law in force between 
1878 and 1890.92 
One might argue that the negative correlation between labor mar-
ket and capital market regulation here does fit a legal origin story: 
Common law systems use disclosure-forcing regulation for securities 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  89  The correlation coefficient is –0.52 and the t-statistic is –2.89, highly significant statistically 
(p<.01).  For LLSV’s twenty-seven developed nations (which are mostly OECD nations anyway), 
the correlation coefficient is –0.58 and the t-statistic is –3.51, even more statistically significant 
(p=.002).  Data for additional nations outside of the OECD is also available.  For the forty-nine 
total nations for which data is available, the t-statistic is –2.80 and the significance level is p<.01.   
  90  For France, see DAVID S. NEWHALL, CLEMENCEAU 254–61 (1991), which describes how 
Clemenceau sent the French military to crush a miners’ strike in 1906, and Jean Sagnes, Voies 
européennes du syndicalisme,  in H ISTOIRE  DU  SYNDICALISME  DANS  LE  MONDE:  DES 
ORIGINES À NOS JOURS 21, 42 (Jean Sagnes ed., 1994).  For Germany, see A DICTIONARY OF 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY  WORLD  HISTORY  33 (John Belchem & Richard Price eds., 1994), 
which states that “[the 1878 German] Anti-socialist Law stemmed from Bismarck’s determination 
to crush the newly formed socialist party . . . .  The law banned socialist political parties and 
meetings, and forbade the publication of newspapers expressing socialist views . . . .  Many socia-
lists were imprisoned or chose exile.”  See also Klaus Tenfelde, Germany, in 1 THE FORMATION 
OF LABOUR MOVEMENTS 1870–1914 — AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 243, 244 (Marcel 
van der Linden & Jürgen Rojahn eds., 1990) (“[T]he new Prussian-German state made every effort 
to at least pacify the labor movement, at best to suppress it. . . . Repressive measures were di-
rected equally against strike activities and organizational efforts.  In this regard, the Socialist Law 
merely represented the climax of the repressive policy conducted by the state against the labor 
movement.”).  
  91  See Sagnes, supra note 90, at 42–43.  Consider:  
[T]here was a remarkable similarity in the substance of [French, American, and British 
labor] law, though the processes by which it was established reflect the differences be-
tween the countries’ respective legal systems.  The Loi Chapelier, a product of the 
French Revolution, and the provisions of the Napoleonic Penal Code forbidding combi-
nations are remarkably similar in substance to British and American doctrines of com-
mon law conspiracy. 
Frederic Meyers, France, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 169, 
170 (Albert A. Blum ed., 1981). 
  92  See Philip Taft, Germany, in COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS 243, 245–47, 253–54 
(Walter Galenson ed., 1952).  
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markets but are laissez-faire for their labor markets.  Civil law systems 
regulate their labor markets but do not use their rule-making capacity 
to force disclosure in their securities markets.  The problem with this 
view isn’t the fit between the opposite outputs but attributing that fit 
to legal origin.  For both securities market regulation (American-style) 
and labor regulation (European-style), a regulator has to write and en-
force rules.  Both use regulatory means to get to these differing out-
puts.  Policy preferences differ, but policy differences are better ex-
plained by ongoing political economy considerations than by medieval 
legal origins. 
4.  Instruments and Power. — More generally here, we should not 
confuse legal tools with the power to use those tools.  Napoleon’s Code 
reined in judges to do the state’s work.  But his Code was just a tool; 
what mattered was that a powerful French state stood behind it.  The 
Code was the instrument of power, not power itself.  If Napoleon had 
not been able to control courts via a code, he could have set up admin-
istrators and, if faced with recalcitrant, classic common law–style 
judges, stripped them of their power entirely. 
Similarly, were the vaunted British courts really the driving force 
in protecting property, or were they rather an epiphenomenon?  The 
latter, it seems: Power had passed by 1688 from the King to the Whigs 
and their merchant constituents.  They had killed one King, dethroned 
another, and chosen his replacement.  They wanted their property pro-
tected and did so via the common law judges.  But if the judges had 
been recalcitrant, the Whigs could have written, enacted, and codified 
new rights of property, in effect translating Locke into a code. 
And in the twentieth century, what counted beyond basic economic 
conditions for a nation’s financial market was not which medieval in-
struments lawmakers had at their disposal.  Rather it was where 
power lay.  Were capital owners ascendant or weak?  Did the state ca-
ter to labor interests?  Were dominant shareholders inside large firms 
able to dominate the polity as well?  Did policymakers see capital as 
conducive to national well-being?  What did those with power want to 
do?  Either set of legal tools would work, if the polity wanted to use 
those tools to favor markets. 
C.  Which System Regulates Securities Markets More? 
The intensity of securities market regulation varies widely. 
1.  Regulatory Budgets. — Howell Jackson has built an important 
new database of the intensity of financial markets regulation, measur-
ing intensity by budgets and personnel.  The database shows common  
492  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  120:460  
law nations regularly spending more on regulating securities markets 
than do civil law systems.93  Figure 3 illustrates. 
 
FIGURE 3.  SPENDING ON SECURITIES REGULATION PER 
BILLION DOLLARS OF STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil law nations spend less regulating securities markets than the 
United States does.  I list in Table 5 the high-regulatory-budget nations 
in the left column and the low-budget regulators in the right column.  
Common law countries dominate the high-spending column and civil 
law nations dominate the low-spending column.  Qualitative results 
are similar.  Civil law nations have weaker insider trading sanctions.95  
Yet Table 4 shows the same nations’ propensity for strong labor law.  
Some nations simply value securities markets and devote money and 
people to make them work, typically via regulation.96 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  93  Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evi-
dence and Potential Implications 19–20 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Harvard 
Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839250. 
  94  Id. at 19 (drawing on data from FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2003–2004 app. 5 
at 100 (2004), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar03_04/ar03_04app5.pdf).  One 
might adjust market capitalization to GDP for the float, not total capitalization.  But nations with 
many controlling shareholders might need more enforcement resources, not fewer.  (The control-
lers’ political influence might explain why enforcement resources are low in some nations.)  
  95  See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Compara-
tive Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 159 (2005). 
  96  Rich countries that spend more on securities regulations and have more people enforcing 
them have bigger financial markets, more initial public offerings, and more firms.  See Howell E. 
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public Enforcement and Financial Markets: Preliminary Evidence 2 
(Oct. 23, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  That 
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True, Table 5 shows that spending correlates with origin.  But con-
ceptually, common law ought not to force high regulatory spending, 
nor should civil law nations be less willing to spend and regulate.  The 
usual preconceptions would predict the opposite.  Yet the American 
polity accepts securities market regulation, especially when it is cast as 
protecting small shareholders from insider machinations.  The wider 
distribution of securities could help to explain that willingness to 
spend. 
 
TABLE 5.  HIGH COMMON LAW BUDGETS 
FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION97 
 
Nations with high stockholder rights  Nations with low stockholder rights 
Country 
Budget (Per 
Billion 
of GDP)  Legal Origin  Country 
Budget (Per 
Billion 
of GDP)  Legal Origin 
Luxembourg $1,043,972 Civil    Denmark  $92,925 Civil   
Hong Kong  665,801 Common  Finland  88,199 Civil   
Singapore  483,016 Common    Austria  86,853 Civil   
United States  425,827 Common    Portugal  84,615 Civil   
Australia  413,265 Common    Sweden  83,373 Civil   
Ireland  316,872 Common    Switzerland  83,301 Civil   
Israel  278,641 Common    Norway  83,258 Civil   
United Kingdom  276,788 Common    France  74,533 Civil   
South Korea  268,509  Civil   New Zealand  73,026 Common   
Canada  148,908 Common    Spain  53,057 Civil   
Netherlands  144,031 Civil    Greece  52,023 Civil   
Belgium  142,715 Civil    Italy  50,648 Civil   
Argentina  141,473 Civil    Germany  45,441 Civil   
     Japan  32,825 Civil   
Average 
budget of high 
regulators 
$365,371  8 common law 
Average 
budget of low 
regulators 
$70,291  1 common law 
 
 2 .  The SEC. — The SEC protects American stockholders distant 
from their firms from insider machinations.  It regulates.  It operates 
via detailed codification in the Code of Federal Regulations. 
True, some securities regulation comes via the courts.  Much of the 
American jurisprudence of securities fraud is judge-made.  But even 
there, the judges make the rules only after a regulator — the SEC 
usually, the Department of Justice occasionally — acts.  And, true, the 
SEC often has a common law style.  It consults the regulated, as it 
must under the Administrative Procedure Act.98  It gives the accused a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
correlation doesn’t eliminate the possibility of reverse causation — that is, a country gets a good 
stock market for some exogenous reason and then the stock-owning polity demands protection. 
  97 Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Data Updates for 
Selected Variables (Nov. 2006) (unpublished data, on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  98  5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, §§ 701–706 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).  
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chance to be heard via a Wells submission.  But these are regulatory 
nuances.  And even when the securities laws operate through private 
suits, James Cox, Randall Thomas, and Dana Kiku have importantly 
shown that an SEC enforcement action is often the foundation for a 
successful private lawsuit.99 
Consider how the United States reacted to the recent Enron and 
WorldCom scandals, which called into question both the quality of 
American corporate governance and the capacity of American law to 
protect distant stockholders from insiders’ scheming.  The polity de-
manded and got reform.  But headlines didn’t demand action from 
common law judges.100  Rather, the legislature legislated and told the 
regulators to regulate.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 gave the SEC 
new authority and charged it to better protect investors — via codifi-
cation and directive regulation.101  Legislators buttressed regulatory 
and not common law institutions.102 
III.  REEXAMINING THE DATA: DO POLITICAL ECONOMY 
DIFFERENCES BETTER EXPLAIN FINANCIAL DIFFERENCES? 
Thus, the qualitative evidence supports neither the fiduciary duty 
theory nor history as providing compelling legal origin channels driv-
ing nations to have sharply differing financial systems.  But even 
though proponents may not yet have found a convincing channel from 
legal origin to financial markets, legal origin and securities market 
strength correlate.  Proponents might argue that the right channel just 
needs to be found, not that the theory ought to be abandoned.  But in 
this Part, I explain the variation in finance in the wealthy West with-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  99  James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empiri-
cal Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777 (2003).  Bidirectional causation again cannot be ruled out: the 
SEC may act because it fears being embarrassed if it does nothing and private suits later show 
wrongdoing. 
  100  See, e.g., Triumph of the Pygmy State, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 2003, at 55–56; cf. Robert B. 
Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99 (2003) (showing that states 
acted slowly).  It’s not so much that state courts stood still — they did act — but that legislatures 
and regulators acted first and strongest.  And a fear of federalization could have prompted what 
judicial toughness emerged.  See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 
601–06, 643 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 
YALE L.J. 621, 682 (2003). 
  101  Plaintiffs bringing post-scandal private lawsuits found the securities laws more congenial 
for suing than common law fiduciary duties.  See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securi-
ties Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 V AND. L. REV. 859, 861, 
864 (2003).   
  102  Securities regulation isn’t absent from recent important legal origins work.  See Edward 
Glaeser, Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853 (2001); 
La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note 19.  These authors see SEC regulation as an outgrowth 
of the common law, but it is better seen as supplanting or supplementing common law lawmak-
ing.  And it does need regulators — government administrative officials — to make it work.  
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out using legal origin.  The richer common law nations experienced the 
twentieth century differently from the richer civil law nations: the 
former were relatively spared from the most severe early-twentieth-
century destruction, and the latter were not.  Postwar policies differed, 
quite possibly because of the nations’ contrasting prior historical ex-
periences, and these differences in postwar policies can explain late-
twentieth-century financial contrasts in the wealthy West as strongly 
as legal origins in terms of regressions, and better in terms of qualita-
tive linkages. 
The central thesis in Part III is that modern political economy 
channels explain modern financial markets more strongly than medie-
val legal origin.  And each plausible postwar political economy chan-
nel maps onto an abstraction from modern political theory — left-right 
conflict, the median voter theorem, or the power of political   
incumbency. 
A.  Reexamining Legal Origins as Predicting 
Ownership Separation in the Wealthy West 
1.  Corporate Law, Legal Origin, and Legislative Policy. —  In a 
well-known finding, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer showed 
that legal origin correlates with both the degree of ownership separa-
tion in a nation’s large firms and the quality of its corporate law.103  
(Ownership separation — the extent to which a country’s large firms 
have dispersed owners and no controlling shareholder — roughly 
shows the willingness of outsiders to turn over their investments to 
corporate insiders.104  I focus on separation here in the text for con-
creteness, and in the data Appendix I show similar results for other 
usual measures of financial development.) 
Table 6 shows some of that data.  The legal origin theory has much 
going for it here: both its original fiduciary duty angle and the over-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  103  See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 494, 506 
(1999); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1113–52.  Recent work focuses on com-
mon law nations’ securities laws that facilitate private lawsuits.  See La Porta et al., What 
Works?,  supra note 19, at 22 (saying that perhaps “we have [now] found the ‘true’ channel 
through which legal origin matters”).   
  104  La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 103, measure ownership 
separation for a nation based on whether its mid-sized public firms usually have a large stock-
holder.  They measure stockholder rights — high in the countries on the left side of Table 6, low 
in those on the right — by counting corporate law measures that give stockholders specific reme-
dies against insiders.   
   Separation is not the ultimate measure of financial depth: strong insiders may stay inside 
the firm to keep an eye on managers, for example.  Debt can substitute for outside equity.  Separa-
tion is only one rough indicator.  Other usual indicators are stock market capitalization, the size of 
debt markets, the number of initial public offerings, and the number of firms.  Each of these pre-
sents similar conceptual problems, but in the aggregate they tell us something about the strength 
of a nation’s financial market.    
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regulation of securities markets story are in play.  And the countries 
where the degree of ownership separation is an issue — rich nations 
with large firms — are the countries where legal origins originated, 
where the distinctive civil and common law systems are most highly 
reticulated. 
 
TABLE 6.  CONTROL OF MID-SIZED PUBLICLY TRADED 
FIRMS AROUND THE WORLD105 
 
But it’s not just legal origin that correlates with financial strength.  
The intensity of labor regulation predicts corporate ownership separa-
tion better than legal origin, providing the basis for a political economy 
explanation for financial market strength.  With a modern policy vari-
able predicting ownership separation w e l l ,  w e  h a v e  r e a s o n  t o  t h i n k  
that some nations, as a matter of policy and politics, support labor 
markets and ignore stock markets, presumably because labor interests 
dominate or influence their governments whereas finance-oriented 
property interests do not.  Since nations that regulate stock markets 
weakly regulate labor markets strongly, we have reason to think that 
that policy package — strong labor, weak finance — is central in af-
fecting finance.  Table 4 shows a negative correlation between labor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  105  Based on id. at 494 tbl.3.  The twenty-seven nations in Table 6 are exactly the twenty-seven 
nations that those authors use.  Id.  The nations are mostly the richer OECD nations.  
Nations with high stockholder rights  Nations with low stockholder rights 
 
Country 
Ownership 
Separation  Legal Origin   
Country 
Ownership 
Separation  Legal Origin 
United States   0.90  Common   Switzerland   0.50  Civil  
Ireland   0.63  Common   Denmark   0.30  Civil  
Canada   0.60  Common   South Korea   0.30  Civil  
United Kingdom   0.60  Common   Belgium   0.20  Civil  
New Zealand   0.57  Common   Finland   0.20  Civil  
Singapore   0.40  Common   Germany   0.10  Civil  
Australia   0.30  Common   Israel   0.10  Common  
Japan   0.30  Civil   Netherlands   0.10  Civil  
Norway   0.20  Civil   Sweden   0.10  Civil  
Argentina   0.00  Civil   Austria   0.00  Civil  
Hong Kong   0.00  Common   France   0.00  Civil  
Spain   0.00  Civil   Greece   0.00  Civil  
     Italy    0.00  Civil  
     Mexico    0.00  Civil  
     Portugal    0.00  Civil  
Average ownership 
dispersion in 
nations with high 
stockholder rights 
0.38  8 common 
law nations 
Average ownership
dispersion in 
nations with low 
stockholder rights 
0.13  1 common law 
nation 
     Overall average 
dispersion  0.24    
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and stock market regulation.  Table 7 shows labor power nicely pre-
dicting ownership separation. 
 
TABLE 7.  A POLICY VARIABLE: LABOR PROTECTION (HIGH 
LABOR POWER; LOW OWNERSHIP SEPARATION)106 
 
Table  9 in the data Appendix, p. 518, technically compares the ex-
planatory power of securities regulation and labor policy for ownership 
separation.  Yes, stronger securities disclosure predicts more ownership 
separation well, as column (1) shows.  But labor policy, in column (2), 
better predicts ownership separation.107  When the two are run to-
gether, as in column (3), labor policy is the stronger predictor.  Legal 
origin is even less important in predicting ownership once we account 
for whether a nation’s legislative policy favors capital markets or pre-
fers to protect incumbent workers, as columns (4) and (5) show.  Al-
though modern labor policy in theory could flow from distant legal 
origin,108 it more likely flows from postwar policy. 
The regressions hardly prove that modern legislative policy is more 
important than legal origin to finance.  It’s not just that correlation is 
not causation, but that since all three institutions — legal origin, labor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  106  Based on id. at 1362–63 tbl.3; La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, su-
pra note 103, at 494 tbl.3.  “Total Labor Power” aggregates the Botero indices of employment and 
collective bargaining laws. 
  107  The content of the labor power index is described supra note 88.   
  108  See Botero et al., supra note 7, at 1340, 1365, 1370 (asserting that legal origin more than 
politics “shapes [a nation’s] regulation of labor”). 
Nations with high labor power  Nations with low labor power 
Country 
Total Labor 
Power 
Ownership 
Separation 
 
Country 
Total Labor 
Power 
Ownership 
Separation 
Portugal  1.46  0.00 Belgium  0.94 0.20 
France  1.41  0.00 Argentina  0.92 0.00 
Norway  1.33  0.20 Switzerland  0.87 0.50 
Spain  1.33  0.00 Austria  0.86 0.00 
Germany  1.31  0.10 Ireland  0.81 0.63 
Sweden  1.28  0.10 Japan  0.79 0.30 
Italy  1.28  0.00 Australia  0.72 0.30 
Netherlands  1.19  0.10 Singapore  0.65 0.40 
Mexico  1.17  0.00 Hong  Kong  0.63 0.00 
Finland  1.06  0.20 Israel  0.60 0.10 
Greece  1.00  0.00 United  States  0.48 0.90 
Denmark  0.99 0.30 United  Kingdom  0.47 0.60 
South Korea  0.99 0.30 Canada  0.46 0.60 
     New  Zealand  0.41 0.57 
High labor power 
nations’ average  1.22  0.10  Low labor power 
nations’ average  0.69  0.36 
     Overall average  0.91  0.23  
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policy, and securities policy — correlate, we don’t know for sure which 
one is doing most of the work.  In theory, something in legal origin 
could induce people to prefer stockholders to workers in common law 
nations and induce the converse in civil law nations.  But if so, (a) 
both sets of nations use roughly similar tools (regulators), and (b) they 
did not have such preference packages at the end of the nineteenth 
century, when core civil law nations were antagonistic to labor move-
ments.  Moreover, once the origins theory is based not on institutions 
but on national preferences — claiming that one origin prefers markets 
and the other does not — we have much stronger, recent history to ex-
plain contrasting national preferences. 
2.  The World Wars. — These late-twentieth-century policy differ-
ences may stem from differing national experiences during the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Financial markets were developing 
nicely in civil law nations until 1913, and state presence did not differ 
much among the core countries of either origin.  But the core civil law 
nations suffered internecine ruin from 1914 to 1945, with most overrun 
and militarily occupied.  Such convulsive events destroy institutions, 
wreck societal foundations, and heighten voters’ insecurity.  By con-
trast, a channel of water or an ocean separated the core common law 
nations from the cauldron of the early twentieth century, sheltering 
their markets from similar disruption. 
As a consequence, voters’ attitudes toward risk differed among na-
tions in the wealthy West after World War II.  Strong securities mar-
kets propel change, and a stunned populace may have abhorred more 
risk in their economic lives.  And, due to the differing degrees of war-
time destruction and interwar inflation, capital holdings of the average 
citizen differed.  If the financial savings of a nation’s middle class were 
devastated first by interwar hyperinflation and depression and then by 
wartime destruction of the underlying physical assets, it is possible 
that, for decades after 1945, typical voters in such a nation would have 
cared little about protecting financial capital because they had little of 
it and because their well-being was tied more to their human capital. 
To see if the World Wars’ relative wreckage and not legal origin is 
plausibly our core cause in the wealthy West, I took the ratio of GDP 
in 1945 to that in 1913 as measuring a nation’s twentieth-century war-
time devastation.  This ratio roughly predicts ownership diffusion forty 
years after the end of World War II, as Figure 4 shows intuitively and 
Table  11 in the data Appendix shows technically.  And it does so con-
trolling for GDP in the 1990s: even if a nation rebuilt and became 
richer, the Wars’ devastation correlates with weak modern securities 
markets.  The mid-century destruction unleashed social and political 
forces that created strong or weak securities markets in the subsequent 
decades.  I suspect it’s no accident that Switzerland — a civil law na-
tion — has securities markets and ownership separation numbers that 
more closely resemble those in America and Britain than those in  
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France or Germany: Switzerland is one of the few core civil law na-
tions not destroyed during the twentieth century.109 
 
FIGURE 4.  MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY ECONOMIC COLLAPSE 
PREDICTS WEAK OWNERSHIP SEPARATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So financial markets in major civil law nations were developing 
nicely until 1913, as summarized in Table 3.  Mid-twentieth-century 
ruin strongly predicts late-twentieth-century financial markets’ rela-
tive strength.  It may explain both post–World War II strong labor pol-
icy in the devastated nations and the weaknesses of securities markets 
in the same nations. 
3.  Invasions and Military Occupation: The Twentieth Century’s 
Centers of Institutional Destruction. — GDP change is not the only 
way to measure a nation’s twentieth-century devastation.  Some na-
tions suffered invasion, military occupation, and revolution, all of 
which presumably degraded their institutions more than economic re-
versal alone.  We see in Table 8 that whether a nation was occupied or 
suffered a civil war in the twentieth century also predicts weak securi-
ties markets in the 1990s.  Of the nations where more than half of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  109  Britain, the United States, Canada, and Australia all escaped invasion during the twentieth 
century.  If we were invaded, Anglophiles might argue, our legal origin would have enabled us 
postwar to rebuild more quickly, establish markets immediately, and reconstruct our financial sys-
tem in due course.  I argue a parallel point elsewhere but attribute a good part of American resil-
iency during the Depression to the country’s political stability and the wide distribution of mid-
dle-class property, not legal origin.  See R OE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS  OF  CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 28, at 116–24; Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1998). 
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mid-sized public firms have been widely held, all were stable in the 
twentieth century; none suffered a military occupation, civil war, or 
violent revolution.  The nations that had lower ownership separation 
in 1995 suffered the most instability earlier.  Moreover, “Total Destruc-
tion,” which combines into a single variable the two measures of de-
struction — economic and military — even more strongly predicts the 
strength of late-twentieth-century securities markets, as I show in Ta-
ble 12 in the data Appendix.  Economic and military devastation con-
sistently predict weak end-of-the-twentieth-century financial markets 
in the wealthy West as well as, or better than, legal origin. 
 
TABLE 8.  MODERN NATIONAL HISTORY AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS IN THE WEALTHY WEST110 
 
Postwar trendlines also point to war as more important than legal 
origin.  If origin were the core cause, then its posited effects on finan-
cial outcomes should persist through time.  If the World Wars were 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  110  Determinations regarding whether a nation suffered military occupation or civil war come 
from THE STATESMAN’S YEARBOOK (Barry Turner ed., 141st ed. 2005).  Four nations’ classifi-
cations were ambiguous.  Ireland could have been classified as unstable during its early-
twentieth-century independence era, although much twentieth-century unrest was in Ulster, 
which did not become part of Ireland.  (Ireland could also be seen as militarily occupied until 
1922.)  Mexico faced a civil war that ended in the 1920s, but because it has been stable since, it 
could also have been reasonably classified as stable.  Israel and Argentina are hard to classify.  In 
the regressions, I classify Israel as unstable for obvious reasons and Argentina, due to the coups of 
the Peronist era, as unstable.  Dropping these four nations from the regressions does not materi-
ally change the results.  (Israel drops anyway from those that require a 1913 GDP.)  All nations 
with ownership separation of .50 or greater were stable. 
Nations with higher ownership dispersion  Nations with lower ownership dispersion 
 
Country 
Ownership 
Separation 
Military 
Occupation? 
 
Country 
Ownership 
Separation 
Military 
Occupation? 
United States   0.90  Stable  Netherlands   0.10  Occupied 
Ireland   0.63  Stable  Germany   0.10  Occupied 
Canada   0.60  Stable  Sweden   0.10  Stable 
United Kingdom  0.60  Stable  Israel  0.10  Unstable 
New Zealand   0.57  Stable  Hong Kong   0.00  Occupied 
Switzerland   0.50  Stable  Spain   0.00  Civil war 
Singapore   0.40  Occupied  France   0.00  Occupied 
Australia   0.30  Stable  Mexico   0.00  Civil war 
Japan   0.30  Occupied  Greece   0.00  Occupied 
Denmark   0.30  Occupied  Italy   0.00  Occupied 
South Korea   0.30  Occupied  Argentina  0.00  Unstable 
Norway  0.20  Occupied  Austria   0.00  Occupied 
Belgium  0.20  Occupied  Portugal   0.00  Coup d’état 
Finland  0.20  Occupied      
Higher 
ownership 
dispersion 
0.49  7 of 14 stable 
Lower 
ownership 
dispersion 
0.03  1 of 13 stable  
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more important, then their effects should have begun to fade during 
the succeeding decades, as Table 3 shows they did, a trendline that fits 
less well with legal origin than with postwar political consequences. 
4.  Fighting Communism After the World Wars; Ignoring Capital 
Markets. — The basic postwar political facts in Continental Europe 
are clear: polities placated voting workers, with political leaders often 
turning not to markets but to governments to mobilize capital.111  And 
in Western Europe and East Asia, the typical postwar polity was fight-
ing communism.  A nation fighting communism externally and inter-
nally — the Communist Party got more than a quarter of the vote in 
the first postwar French election and was that strong in Italy for dec-
ades112 — would adopt policies differing from those of nations that felt 
more secure.  Even locally right politicians favored policies concilia-
tory to those to whom the Communist Party could appeal.113  From 
about 1948 to 1989, the communist threat was central to international 
and much domestic politics.  As Raymond Aron, the conservative 
French public intellectual, put it: “Every action, in the middle of the 
twentieth century, presupposes and involves the adoption of an atti-
tude with regard to the Soviet enterprise.”114  As Tony Judt’s recent 
retrospective states: 
The attraction of Communism was real.  Although the Communist parties 
of Italy, France and Belgium . . . remained in governing coalitions [only] 
until May 1947, through their trade union affiliates and popular demon-
strations they were able to mobilize popular anger and capitalize on the 
failures of their own governments.  The electoral successes of local Com-
munists, combined with the aura of the invincible Red Army, made an 
Italian (or French, or Czech) ‘road to Socialism’ seem plausible and seduc-
tive.  By 1947 907,000 men and women had joined the French Communist 
Party.  In Italy the figure was two and a quarter million, far more than in 
Poland or even Yugoslavia.115 
*  *  *  * 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  111  See A NDREW  SHONFIELD,  MODERN  CAPITALISM:  THE  CHANGING  BALANCE  OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER 84–85 (1969).   
  112  See TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 79, 207 (2005). 
  113  Locally right-wing European governments sometimes favored labor.  See Botero et al., su-
pra note 7, at 1348–49, 1353–56, 1362–63.  Fighting communism can explain why.  In any event, 
one ought not array governments, as Botero et al. do, on a locally left-right spectrum, but rather 
on an absolute scale.  Germany’s Helmut Kohl and France’s Charles de Gaulle were locally right 
but more to the left economically than conservatives in the United States and Britain.  They pla-
cated local left interests. 
  114  JUDT, supra note 112, at 197 (quoting RAYMOND ARON, THE OPIUM  OF  THE INTEL-
LECTUALS 55 (1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Raymond Aron, although a lifelong 
anti-Communist, acknowledged ”that Marxism was the dominant idea of the age: the secular re-
ligion of its epoch.”  Id. at 401. 
  115  Id. at 88.    
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Thus, after World War II, the world’s richest nations had reasons 
to pursue differing policies vis-à-vis labor and capital markets.  Differ-
ences in how nations experienced twentieth-century war, occupation, 
and local communist influence do seem strong bases for producing 
sharply differing postwar policies toward labor and capital markets. 
B.  Politics-Based Theories for the Developed World 
Political economy–based theories seem stronger than the legal ori-
gins theory.  In this section, I briefly outline them.  Although each dif-
fers from the others, they share a core — namely, that politics affects 
whether policymakers want to, and can, build financial markets. 
While it makes sense intuitively that politics is more important 
than origin, specifying the exact channel through which politics links 
political preferences and institutions to financial markets is not easy.  
That is the task for future work, but promising starts have been made. 
The first political economy channel has military occupation weak-
ening institutions overall.  When it came time to rebuild, the polity re-
built human institutions in early decades, waiting until later to rebuild 
stock markets.  The second channel ties destruction to postwar domes-
tic politics.  Stunned voters were averse to risk, labor was powerful, 
and savings were meager.  Those background political conditions were 
not market-friendly.  The third channel is postwar international poli-
tics.  The program in many nations was fighting communism, inducing 
most Western European and East Asian governments to befriend in-
ternational communism’s most likely domestic allies.  A fourth channel 
is that destroyed nations do not immediately need large pools of capi-
tal from financial markets.116  Banks are adept at allocating capital to 
known technologies, while securities markets are more adept at allo-
cating capital to new and untried technologies.117  After World War II, 
reconstruction was largely a known task for which banks were well 
suited, perhaps better suited than volatile equity markets, and which 
fit with a polity that preferred steady and low-risk reconstruction. 
1.  Left-Right Labor Politics. — I’ve argued elsewhere that Euro-
pean social democracies did not provide the institutions that securities 
markets need because their concerns lay elsewhere.  Stockholders in 
firms subject to heavy labor pressures (from inside the firm or from 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  116  Founders built new firms in the 1950s in the wake of wartime destruction.  Some firms suc-
ceeded, stayed in family hands for another generation or two, and then started to diffuse their 
ownership.  Nations not destroyed in the World Wars presumably saw more of their firms’ foun-
ders disperse their ownership earlier. 
  117  See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Stock Markets and Resource Allocation, in C APITAL MARKETS 
AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 81, 104–05 (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993); Colin 
Mayer, Financial Systems and Corporate Governance: A Review of the International Evidence, 
154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 144, 161 (1998).  
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pro-labor government actors) were often unwilling to turn their firms 
over to professional managers for fear that the managers would not be 
loyal enough to distant stockholders.  Labor made strong claims on 
firms’ cash flows, and concentrated owners could resist some of those 
claims.
118 
The potential importance of left-right labor differences to capital 
markets and corporate ownership can be seen by looking at recent dis-
putes at Daimler-Benz, Germany’s largest manufacturing firm.  Wolf-
gang Bernhard, who had been “the hard-charging No. 2 executive at 
the company’s Chrysler division,” was slated to run the company’s 
Mercedes division.119  But Bernhard’s promotion was “scuttled at the 
last minute . . . ostensibly to mollify workers at Mercedes.  [The work-
ers were said to have been] offended by Mr. Bernhard’s suggestion that 
Mercedes was in need of a radical overhaul.”120 
Labor participates in management in Germany.  Where labor’s in-
fluence is strong, concentrated ownership should persist as a counter-
vailing power and, hence, equity markets should develop less strongly.  
Moreover, some polities demean the tools that align managers in dif-
fusely owned firms with shareholders, such as incentive compensation, 
shareholder-value norms, hostile takeovers, and financial transpar-
ency.121  Close owners do better for shareholders than diffuse owners 
because close owners can cabin managerial agency costs better than 
distant, small shareholders.  Such agency costs could readily be high in 
firms in which powerful labor interests press managers to ignore 
shareholder value.  Several studies show how wages rise when owners 
do not tightly control managers.122 
More directly, in some polities, managers who expand their firms 
and hire more employees cannot easily retreat later if the expansion 
proves unprofitable.  Local labor rigidities preclude easy downsizing.  
But managers who are not tied to shareholders — such as managers 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  118  See ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 28, at 
35; Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control,  53 
STAN. L. REV. 539, 600–03 (2000). 
  119  Mark Landler, Dispute Disrupts Daimler in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at W1. 
  120  Id. 
  121  Transparency is complex: labor might want transparency of profits, but close capital owners 
might not.  Distant capital owners are ambivalent: they need transparency to check on insiders 
but fear it would strengthen labor’s claims on firms’ cash flows. 
  122  See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A 
Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999); Antoinette Schoar, Effects of Cor-
porate Diversification on Productivity,  57 J. FIN. 2379, 2381,  2399–2401 (2002) (data showing 
diversified firms pay higher wages); Henrik Cronqvist et al., Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their 
Workers More? (Nov. 28,  2005),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=845844.  Countries with 
more hostile labor relations have more concentrated ownership.  See Holger M. Mueller & Tho-
mas Philippon, Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor Relations (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  
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who face little shareholder oversight in diffusely owned firms — would 
worry less about the consequences to themselves of expanding unprof-
itably than would owner-managers.  The owner-managers’ money is at 
risk, unlike the diffusely owned firms’ managers’ money.  The dif-
fusely owned firms’ managers presumably prefer the power and pres-
tige of bigger firms and wish to avoid the stress of labor confrontation; 
they do not defend stockholders’ interests as strongly as does the 
owner-manager.  Hence, the original owners find it harder to diffuse 
ownership because the firm is worth less in the hands of diffuse own-
ers than in the hands of concentrated owners. 
Consider Figure 5, which shows the fit between a nation’s devasta-
tion from the World Wars and later labor prominence.  The sources of 
this left-right labor-based divide for decades after World War II could 
be several.  The organization of production could have been labor in-
tensive.  Voters stunned by the Wars could have been risk averse and 
lacked their own financial savings and capital to protect.  The govern-
ing parties — even those on the right — could have deferred to local 
labor to blunt a communist appeal.  That left-right divide was there 
after World War II and was stronger for several decades in some na-
tions than in others.  And where it was strong, capital markets were 
weak. 
 
FIGURE 5.  TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEVASTATION PREDICTS 
POSTWAR LABOR POWER123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  123  Destruction here is based on the GDP ratio used in Table 3, supra p. 488, minus one if the 
nation was occupied as in Table 8, supra p. 500.  The United States is recentered at zero, to be the 
nation suffering the least destruction.  I here use only the twenty-seven nations in Table 8 that 
were first used in the legal origins literature to show an alternative explanation for differences in 
postwar financial markets.  (Two nations drop out because of a lack of GDP data.)  For the most 
part, the twenty-seven are the rich OECD nations. 
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2.  Incumbent Capital Owners. — Incumbents dislike new competi-
tors.  The already successful owners often do not want strong financial 
markets to develop because better financial markets would strengthen 
new competitors.  Since the incumbents already have capital — or ac-
cess to it — they prefer weak investor protection, so as to crimp new 
entrants’ capacity to raise capital.  Hence, incumbents oppose financial 
development.124 
And wealthy incumbent capital owners have the resources to stifle 
competition by contributing to politicians who pass rules that stymie 
upstarts from going into business.  Since the new entrants don’t have 
wealth (yet), they cannot fuel political campaigns as easily as can the 
incumbents.125  Incumbents also have a corporate reason to oppose fi-
nancial improvement.  Once incumbents have structures that benefit 
them, they dislike strong financial markets, which could destroy those 
benefits.126 
3.  Trade Openness. — However, Rajan and Zingales argue, when a 
nation is open to trade, the incumbents’ calculations — and their po-
litical power — change.  The incumbents face tougher product market 
competition and need new financing themselves.  Hence, they are less 
willing and less able to oppose better capital markets.127  When Euro-
pean political leaders lowered trade barriers in the decades after World 
War II — as they sought to unify the Continent economically to avoid 
future wars — incumbents had less reason to oppose stronger capital 
markets, which grew. 
4.  Median Voter. — Central to modern political science is the me-
dian voter theorem: Voters are arrayed on a left-right spectrum and 
distributed over a center-humped normal curve.  Politicians seek out 
the median voter, who determines the election and a nation’s poli-
tics.128  Enrico Perotti and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden recently put 
forth a median voter hypothesis for financial market strength: In some 
richer democracies, the median voter owns less financial capital or has 
more labor-based human capital to protect than the median voter in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  124  Rajan & Zingales, supra note 84, at 19.  Similar ideas are found in Mark J. Roe, Rents and 
Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1490 & n.47 (2001); Enrico C. Perotti & 
Paolo F. Volpin, Lobbying on Entry 1–2 (EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 2277, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=558588 (arguing that incumbent entrepreneurs out-lobby new 
entrants). 
  125  See  RAGHURAM  G.  RAJAN  &  LUIGI  ZINGALES,  SAVING  CAPITALISM  FROM  THE 
CAPITALISTS 182 (2003).   
  126  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Own-
ership and Governance, 52 STAN. L.  REV. 127, 157–60 (1999). 
  127  See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 84, at 36, 42–43. 
  128  See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 16, 18 (1958); 
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 117–18 (1957).  The theorem 
depends on voters facing few cross-cutting preferences so that most voters can be arrayed on a 
single spectrum.  
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other nations.  Such voters do not vote to develop capital markets — 
which by fostering industrial and financial change could quickly erode 
the median voter’s own human capital.129 
Torben Iversen and David Soskice set up the baseline idea here: 
“[I]ndividuals who have made risky investments in skills will demand 
insurance against the possible future loss of income from those invest-
ments.”130  The polity in nations where such individuals are the me-
dian voters should dampen the rapid industrial change that strong fi-
nancial markets propel.  Posit a country that has banks that prefer 
low-risk enterprises and employees whose income and wealth come 
from wages, not savings and capital.  Especially if the employees have 
firm-specific skills that capital markets imperil, these employees would 
prefer low-risk corporate ownership structures to vibrant equity mar-
kets, which can corrode incumbent industries.  Incumbent financiers 
— the banks in particular — and incumbent employees combine to sti-
fle securities markets.131 
Perotti and von Thadden argue that, hence, an economically and 
financially enfeebled middle class in the countries previously ravaged 
by inflation, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and Italy, re-
sponded to the Great Depression by seeking stabilizing governance 
structures and greater social insurance.  The result was greater restric-
tion of markets and the emergence of other features of corporatist 
economies.132 
5.  Core Similarities. — Other political economy channels can be 
relevant: Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin argue that some parliamen-
tary systems produce a corporatist-type deal between owners of closely 
held firms and labor that yields weak financial rules.133  Dennis Muel-
ler argues that dispersed single-member district polities are harder for 
centralized interest groups like unions to influence than centralized, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  129  See Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Corporate 
Control and Labor Rents, 114 J. POL. ECON. 145, 169 (2006). 
  130  Torben Iversen & David Soskice, An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences, 95 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 875, 875 (2001) (emphasis omitted).  “[I]nvestment in skills that are specific to a particu-
lar firm, industry, or occupation exposes their owners to risks for which they will seek nonmarket 
protection.  Skills that are portable, by contrast, do not require extensive nonmarket protection 
. . . .”  Id.  
  131  True, neither the European, Asian, nor American median voter owned much common stock, 
making a pure stock-ownership-based median voter theory weak.  Rather, Americans who own 
financial and other property made up a larger fraction of the electorate than in Europe.  That 
smaller fraction in European countries made it easier for politicians to denigrate capital-favoring 
rules and institutions.  (Reverse and bidirectional causality are again possible.  If stockholders are 
protected, then the average person is more willing to hold stock.) 
  132  See Perotti & von Thadden, supra note 129, at 168.     
  133  See Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1027 (2005).  
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party-based parliamentary polities.134  Peter Gourevitch and James 
Shinn contrast corporatist polities and liberal market economies: the 
former have weak and the latter have strong securities markets.135 
Although these political economy explanations differ — and politi-
cal theorists have a stake in which ones better describe modern democ-
ratic polities — all have two features in common.  At their core, they 
are all theories of democratic policymaking, not legal origin.  Each ties 
to the World Wars and the interwar era as laying the foundation for 
the political economy contrasts of the late twentieth century in the 
wealthy West. 
Thus, trade policy is primary in one theory.  But for a nation to 
have open trade, its polity must permit it.  In democratic polities, 
business leaders cannot build trade barriers if the rest of the polity op-
poses them.  They need allies among the voters, and a left-right or a 
corporatist political framework tells us something about whether they 
can find such allies.  Incumbent owners need incumbent workers for 
the votes that shield established sectors from trade and competition. 
Similarly, a median voter theory depends on the average voter 
valuing human capital more than financial capital, so that voters who 
would constitute the left in more conservative nations dominate the 
middle.  And a left-right theory needs to explain — when the left, even 
if powerful, is not where the median voter is — why the median voter 
coalesces with the left and how that then affects firms and stock       
markets. 
To bring the connectedness of the political economy explanations 
full circle, if a nation has an exogenous reason to promote free trade — 
historical proclivities, international alliances136 — then free trade can 
shatter the power of incumbent labor and corporatist interests.137  Re-
ducing trade barriers may tear down roadblocks to stock markets.   
The converse is also so; if trade is closed and product competition 
weak, the nation’s polity can protect incumbent labor more easily than 
polities more open to trade could.  Labor can have a greater say in the 
firm, competitive markets aren’t powerful enough to counter labor’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  134  See Mueller, supra note 20, at 16–22. 
  135  See PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND COR-
PORATE CONTROL 22 (2005); Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Introduction to VARIETIES  OF 
CAPITALISM 1, 8–9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).   
  136  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The International Relations Wedge in the Corporate Convergence 
Debate, in CONVERGENCE  AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 161 (Jeffrey 
N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004). 
  137  See Neal E. Boudette, As Jobs Head East in Europe, Power Shifts Away from Unions, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at A1.  
508  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  120:460  
goals, and hence strong owners persist as a counterweight.  The politi-
cal channels reinforce one another and may move as a package.138 
The political theories are not at their core inconsistent with one an-
other, but they are inconsistent with any strong form of the legal origin 
story.  Moreover, they do not describe policies and politics that are 
immutable: a century earlier, many of these nations had contrary poli-
cies and relatively deeper stock markets.  Each theory fits with a mod-
ern polity conditioned by a half-century of war and devastation. 
6.  Britain and Switzerland. — The British and Swiss experiences 
illustrate the thesis here.  True, Britain at first seems at odds with it at 
a superficial level because it had left-oriented politics after World War 
II and relatively deep financial markets.  But those markets developed 
earlier, when Britain was conservative, and persisted in spite of Brit-
ain’s politics in the 1970s.  And Switzerland fits awkwardly with a le-
gal origins perspective because it’s a civil law country with financial 
markets that have been continuously solid through the twentieth cen-
tury.  I briefly examine both. 
Britain suffered greatly during the early twentieth century, and its 
post–World War II politics for a time leaned quite to the left.  Labour 
governments ran Britain in seventeen of the first fifty years after the 
end of the war, mostly from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s,139 and 
they did not do so in the market-friendly mode of Tony Blair. 
But properly analyzed, Britain exemplifies the thesis here, first of 
all because it did not experience its leftward tilt and develop its finan-
cial markets simultaneously.  Rather, Britain built its stock market and 
the related sustaining institutions when it was conservative; ownership 
began separating from control early in the twentieth century, but Brit-
ain’s leftward tilt occurred later when its financial markets had al-
ready been built.140  During this left-leaning period, its financial mar-
kets took a beating but survived.  Britain might not have built strong 
stock market institutions during Labour’s postwar heyday, but by then 
they already existed.141 
Second, British postwar politics show the limits of the legal origin 
theory: when British politics changed, legal origin didn’t stop Britain 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  138 R OE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 28; Roe, 
Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, supra note 124. 
  139  THE STATESMAN’S YEAR-BOOK 1299 (Brian Hunter ed., 134th ed. 1997). 
  140  See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Ownership: Evolution and Regulation 21–
28 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 09/2003, 2005), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=354381.  Earlier data saw the 1980s as the transition period.  See, e.g., 
Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control: 
The British Experience, 46 BUS. HIST. 256, 275 (2004). 
  141  Labour’s heyday was during the 1970s, when British stock market capitalization declined 
about 75%.  See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 84, at 15.  Even British financial markets might not 
have withstood another decade of pressure.  
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from being more regulatory than it had been or than it later became in 
the Thatcher years.  Third, however much Britain suffered during the 
War, institutional continuity was greater there than on the Continent.  
The City — their Wall Street — persisted; the Bank of England and 
the Treasury were staffed with influential players who wanted strong 
British capital markets.  The London Stock Exchange closed on Sep-
tember 1, 1939, and reopened for the War’s duration one week later.142  
Middle-class savings were not obliterated in an interwar hyperinfla-
tion, so Britain had savers and investors — middle-class voters — af-
ter the War.  Fourth, Labour did not seek to displace Britain’s already 
well-developed financial markets with state-driven capital allocation.  
On the Continent, in contrast, new institutions had to be built and 
most governing parties wanted the state to control capital allocation.  
It was easier for Britain to maintain an already extant private capital 
market than for Continental Europe to build a new one atop wartime 
rubble.  Fifth, the British City was itself a powerful interest group that 
could resist change, even in the face of an unsympathetic polity.143  Al-
though the postwar political milieu could have impeded pro-capital, 
pro-finance institutions and interest groups from first arising, these in-
stitutions and interests were already in place.144 
Switzerland, a civil law nation, has had strong financial markets 
throughout the twentieth century.  Although the World Wars surely af-
fected its economy — the country is landlocked and was surrounded 
by warring nations for much of the early twentieth century — it suf-
fered neither a military occupation nor a violent revolution during this 
period. 
Turn back to Table 3 on p. 488.  In 1913, Switzerland’s stock mar-
ket capitalization resembled that of France, Germany, and the other 
civil law nations.  But its stock market capitalization did not collapse 
mid-century, as happened elsewhere in Europe.  By 1999, Swiss stock 
market capitalization as a fraction of its GNP exceeded that of Britain 
and the United States.145  Its density of true public firms resembles 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  142  See RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE 288–90 (1999).    
  143  “In the [Labour-dominated] 1960s, the City had greater bargaining leverage than the Gov-
ernment.”  Sue Bowden & Andrew Gamble, Corporate Governance and Public Policy: ‘New’ Ini-
tiatives by ‘Old’ Labour to Reform Stakeholder Behaviour in the UK, 1965–1969,  5 J. INDUS. 
HIST. 35, 40 (2002). 
  144  This interpretation of the British experience puts a twist on Mancur Olson’s idea that wars 
destroy interest groups, thereby freeing the government and the economy from these groups’ de-
structive grip.  In my version, war destroyed the interest groups that protected finance and capital 
on the Continent, but only weakened them in Britain.  See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 77–
87 (1982).  
  145  See Table 3, supra p. 488.  Switzerland’s status as a refuge for capital — with that capital 
perhaps disproportionately finding its way into Swiss financial markets — must also be part of 
the story.    
510  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  120:460  
more that of Britain than that of the rest of Continental Europe: as 
Table  6 on p. 496 shows, Switzerland’s 1995 index of ownership sepa-
ration (50%) is closer to Britain’s (60%) than to France’s (0%) or Ger-
many’s (10%).  Switzerland’s labor policy was slightly less intense than 
the average, and its securities market regulation was slightly more in-
tense, as shown in Table 4 on p. 489.  The Swiss state had an above-
average role in the economy before World War I, as Table 1 on p. 486 
shows, but a below-average role after World War II. 
Switzerland’s financial markets are unlike those in other civil law 
nations.  Unlike most of them, Switzerland was not occupied in the 
twentieth century.146 
*  *  *  * 
  Political theories explain the relative depth of financial markets in 
the wealthy West as well as, and at times better than, legal origins 
theories.  Figure 6 illustrates a politics and finance view of where the 
foundations for finance lie.  Wartime destruction had a continuing ef-
fect on politics in the wealthy West for decades after World War II and 
fits well with the new political theories.  Financial differences between 
occupied and nonoccupied nations, and between civil and common law 
nations, faded in the wealthy West as 1945 grew more distant.  Since 
the Wars’ effects on politics should fade over time, this fading fits well 
with political theories.  But since legal origin persists, fading fits 
poorly with the legal origins theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  146  The other major Continental European country that was not occupied was Sweden.  Al-
though Swedish corporate ownership — our main metric here — is concentrated, Sweden has had 
one of the stronger financial markets in Europe, with stock ownership widespread through the 
populace and most large firms relying on external capital, even though most have a dominant 
owner.  By most measures, Swedish and Swiss financial markets have been two of the strongest in 
Continental Europe since World War II.  See Jonas Agnblad, Erik Berglöf, Peter Högfeldt & He-
lena Svancar, Ownership and Control in Sweden: Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social 
Control, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 228, 228 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht 
eds., 2001); Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden 25, 32–
34, 54–58 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10641, 2004), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w10641.pdf .  
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FIGURE 6.  A POLITICS AND FINANCE APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Reexamining Method: Instrumental Variables 
and Iterative Development 
A typical legal inquiry examines cases, statutes, and their histories 
and induces a result.  Legal comparativists have long looked at subtle-
ties in language and focused on differences in form, which often yield 
similar functional ends, as Detlev Vagts has reminded us.147  Financial 
economists have reduced comparisons to indices and used basic 
econometric techniques to scrutinize the institutional supports for fi-
nancial markets. 
Each method has strengths and weaknesses.  Traditional compara-
tivists get a nuanced contrast, which can yield a textured theory.  But 
they lack strong means to test competing theories.  Basic econometric 
techniques require straightforward theoretical contrasts to test, but an 
investigator can compare results and reject hypotheses or leave them 
standing.  These techniques, however, may be worse at sorting out 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  147  Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company Law — The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN 
NICOLAS  DRUEY 595,  595–96,  605 (Rainer Schweizer et al. eds., 2002); see also Paul Davies, 
Gerard Hertig & Klaus Hopt, Beyond the Anatomy, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 
216, 216–17 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).  
MODERN POLITICAL 
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complex iterative processes, or those in which several societal features 
simultaneously affect one another. 
Moreover, public choice may be crucial, but it may be that no sin-
gle public choice channel will explain financial outcomes, with particu-
lar public choice channels varying from nation to nation.  Without uni-
formity, the public choice explanation would disappear in the finance 
economists’ regressions, but not in the real world.  The methodological 
challenge for economists is to find public choice metrics that are regu-
lar enough to test. 
A problem in linking law to finance was that the results did not tell 
us which way causation ran: perhaps good law induced strong finance, 
or perhaps deep, strong financial markets called forth good law.  Per-
haps an industrializing economy induced both.  The econometric tech-
nique was to find a feature that correlated with good or bad corporate 
law but which modern markets couldn’t have caused.  Legal origin is 
such a feature, as Figure 2 on p. 480 illustrates.  But the literature then 
jumped to conclude that legal origin primarily caused good financial 
markets.148 
Neither method is attuned to what may be — and I believe is — an 
iterative process.  Some outside event — the rise of large economies of 
scale in industry, for example — gets a stock market started.  The nas-
cent financial market demands a supporting legal structure, which fur-
ther propels securities market development.  The stronger financial 
markets then demand further legal improvements.  If ownership is 
widespread, the owners have a political base to demand protective 
laws.  And so on.  Neither the standard methodology of the legal com-
parativists nor that of the financial economists captures this iterative, 
bidirectional causation well. 
And a case could be made that this iterative, back-and-forth proc-
ess describes how American stock markets developed: The American 
merger wave at the end of the nineteenth century induced a demand 
for financial capital that its fragmented financial institutions could not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  148  See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 103, at 505 (arguing 
that legal origin predicts which countries have better protection for minority shareholders); La 
Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 1, at 1126 (“[O]ur focus on the legal origin becomes cru-
cial. . . . If we find that legal rules differ substantially across legal families and that financing and 
ownership patterns do as well, we have a strong case that legal families, as expressed in the legal 
rules, actually cause outcomes.” (emphasis added)).  Important ongoing analyses, some associated 
with the World Bank, use legal origin as an instrument.  See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, Caralee 
McLiesh & Rita Maria Ramalho, Regulation and Growth 4 (Mar. 17,  2006),  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=893321 (“Legal origin has the characteristics of a good instrument for 
business regulations.  It . . . is linked to the complexity of business regulations.”).  In the first half 
of this Article, I show that legal origin in the end is a poor instrumental variable and, hence, can-
not anchor causation as running primarily from law to financial outcomes.  
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provide directly because they were too small.149  Stock market rules 
provided rudimentary support in 1910, and populist politics kept 
American financial institutions smaller and less powerful than they 
otherwise would have been.150  Later stock exchange rules supported 
the widening of the stock market in the 1920s, and that expansion — 
with the help of a stock market crash and a Depression — provided 
the political impetus for the securities laws of 1933 and 1934.  The 
Glass-Steagall Act151 then reconfirmed  that populist weakening of 
strong finance.152  The securities laws in turn were a foundation for 
further widening of the stock market after World War II. 
And to make explicit the thesis here: Total economic collapse, war, 
revolution, or military occupation could have interrupted that iterative 
process — and did in some nations.  But in the United States, no such 
cataclysm interrupted the process. 
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Although the devastation-by-war theory better explains modern fi-
nancial differences in the wealthy West than does the legal origins the-
ory, it does not (and is not intended to) directly explain differences in 
the rich nations’ former colonies.  In looking to understand whether 
legal origins in richer nations with basic contract and property rights 
in place induce financial differences, we cannot very well expand the 
inquiry to poorer nations with weaker basic institutions.  Indeed, the 
sample with which this legal origins literature begins, consisting of 
twenty-seven mostly OECD countries,153 is about right for our inquiry 
into finance in the wealthy West.  It’s true that adding other Latin 
American, African, and Asian nations reduces the power of the war-
time destruction–based regressions and that in some cases legal origin 
re-emerges as statistically powerful.  But they should disappear: We 
are here using a variable attuned to Europe and the West’s twentieth-
century experience, not the developing world’s.  If we use a more uni-
versal variable for the wider group of nations — political stability — 
politics may well again trump origins.154 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  149  See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (1994); Cheffins, supra note 140, at 257–58; Mark J. Roe, 
Rents and Ownership Separation 15–16 (Sept. 27, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library). 
  150  See ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS, supra note 149, at 30, 33–35, 60–61. 
  151  12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000).  
  152  That’s not to say that many financial laws did not have public policy motivations as well. 
  153  See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 103, at 492. 
  154  See Mark J. Roe & Jordan Siegel, Political Instability and Financial Development (Oct. 20, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  
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There’s good reason to restrict the sample here to the rich, devel-
oped nations.  It’s these developed nations where we’re comparing ap-
ples to apples: in nations where the institutional and economic struc-
ture is developed enough for financial markets to be important, what 
explains differences in financial outcomes?  Moreover, wartime occu-
pation measures whether institutions were weakened and whether the 
polity was risk averse by the mid-twentieth century.  In econometric 
vocabulary, postwar political forces make a difference, but the differ-
ence is conditional on the nation’s being one of the world’s richer   
democracies.155 
But military occupation is not the only way to weaken a nation’s 
institutions and financial markets.  Colonial legacy or twentieth-
century political instabilities in Latin America and post-independence 
Africa, for example, could have yielded results there like those wartime 
devastation did in much of Europe and East Asia.  And many poorer 
nations were occupied — via colonialism — well into the twentieth 
century, while many whose colonial status ended in the nineteenth cen-
tury were saddled with political structures that bred instability. 
That said, the West-based devastation theory helps us to assess the 
likely impact of legal origin on financial development and the efficacy 
of origins-based policies for the developing world.  Since legal origins 
theory poorly explains financial differences in the nations where these 
systems originated, it’s unlikely to strongly explain differences among 
nations to which legal systems were transplanted.156  The analysis here 
of the richer nations thus buttresses alternative theories for the devel-
oping nations.  In the twentieth century, political instability157 and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  155  Formally, I regress financial outcomes on the military occupation variable, obtaining mixed 
results, and then add an interaction variable, membership in the OECD (the richer nations’ club).  
The interaction variable measures whether occupation has an effect on the financial market vari-
able if the nation is rich.  It does, as Table 13, infra p. 521, shows.  The explanation is intuitive: 
some nations had good institutions that were adversely affected by the two World Wars; other 
nations began with poor institutions.  The significance of the interaction variable justifies splitting 
the samples.  For a paper using a similar methodology to split an international sample, see Ran-
dall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have 
Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215 (2000). 
  156  True, in weak institutional environments, origins could be more important than in strong 
institutional environments.  See Beck et al., supra note 21, at 145 (asserting that law evolved in 
France but has stagnated in the former French colonies). 
  157  See Roe & Siegel, supra note 154.  Perhaps instability traces to colonial legacy, which left 
many nations with instabilities distantly similar to those that upset some wealthy Western nations 
in the twentieth century.  Some colonizers wrecked indigenous institutions without building good 
new ones.  See Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, Reversal of Fortune: Ge-
ography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,  117 Q.J. 
ECON. 1231, 1262–65 (2002); Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Colonialism, Inequal-
ity, and Long-Run Paths of Development 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
11057, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11057.pdf; Dani Rodrik, Getting Institu-
tions Right 2–3 (Apr. 2004), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/papers.html.  
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government policies — such as state-led capital allocation strategies 
common for several decades in countries as diverse as Brazil and In-
dia, by which government policy crowded out private finance — are 
likely to prove important in explaining how and why financial markets         
developed. 
If the strong-form legal origins theory were correct, then a nation 
should get common law–style legal rules to propel development.  But 
since the theory is more likely to be incorrect or secondary, then poli-
cymakers under the sway of the origins thinking may induce develop-
ing nations to forgo good alternatives.  If one mode is easier to build 
and sustain, then nations may incur real costs.  Common law institu-
tions tend toward private remedies, but if public enforcement is impor-
tant for financial markets (either because it’s just as good or because 
it’s been needed even in common law nations, as the centrality of the 
American SEC suggests), then developing nations and their advisors in 
the international agencies may make mistakes — possibly big ones. 
There’s more.  If legal structures, whatever their origin, crack and 
collapse because of incompatible political and social foundations, then 
developmental agencies could do damage.  They could focus on build-
ing, say, perfect contract-enforcing institutions that may collapse the 
first time those institutions confront the powers-that-be.  Property-
protecting common law courts and transparency-favoring regulators 
may do well in a polity that wants to protect property.  Transplant 
those courts and regulators into a hostile political environment and the 
polity will displace that judicial and regulatory structure with one to 
its liking.  For the common law–style structure to work, the existing 
societal arrangements would have to change.  But changing them is 
not easy.  Not only is it hard to develop enough social regularity and 
stability so that private structures can flourish, but seeking to do so 
may be beyond the legitimate scope or the real capacity of the devel-
opment agencies.158  Building legal structures incompatible with the 
political framework or the capacity for social stability may waste 
scarce developmental resources.159 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  158  “Until 1996, politics was the variable that dared not speak its name at the [World] Bank. . . . 
The Bank’s . . . charter[] enjoin[s] its officers to remain studiously apolitical.”  A Regime Changes, 
ECONOMIST, June 4, 2005, at 65, 66 (citing Ajay Chhibber’s 1997 World Development Report as 
changing that tradition).  
  159  Some thinking here has offsetting distortions: Common law institutions are seen to be bene-
ficial and not too regulatory.  Securities regulation is (mistakenly) seen as a core common law–
style institution.  So, the syllogism may be challenged in two spots: on the questions of whether 
civil law is intrinsically too regulatory and whether securities regulators and securities regulation 
are core common law institutions.  But by making these two offsetting conceptual errors, the lit-
erature could still come to a useful prescriptive conclusion, namely that building a securities regu-
latory agency and regulating securities markets can, when done astutely, help to develop securities 
markets.  
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Moreover, even if common law’s fiduciary duties were a sine qua 
non for developed stock markets — probably an untrue assertion, as 
we’ve seen — such duties may be ill-suited for developing nations.   
Simple rules should be easier to enforce — if there’s no political inter-
ference — than complex fiduciary standards.160  And the property-
protecting efficacy of the common law depends, as I’ve argued here, 
on a sympathetic legislature.  But if the legislature isn’t sympathetic, 
it’s not obvious whether common law judges or a clear code would do 
better.  A judge who deviates from a clear code is more salient than 
one who scurrilously but surreptitiously misapplies a standard.  A 
weak but independent judiciary could resist some pressure and some-
what enforce a clear code rule but collapse under even light political 
pressure if it had the discretion a standard entails.  In the abstract, 
code-like rules could do better.161 
In essence then, the implications for development policy could be 
that the differences between common law and civil law instruments 
(such as judge-made law, codes, and regulatory agencies) may not be 
very important.  Since the background political environment is indis-
pensable, then the development agencies might choose to spend their 
development dollars in, and give their institutional advice to, those na-
tions that have the requisite political foundations for finance.  Others 
might need humanitarian aid, but the agencies ought to be wary of 
thinking that they can change a polity by getting a few pro-financial-
market rules and courts in place. 
CONCLUSION: POLITICAL ECONOMY VS. LEGAL ORIGIN IN 
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
I’ve here evaluated political economy and legal origins theories of 
where the foundation lies for modern securities markets in the wealthy 
West.  Differences in legal origins probably were never strong enough 
to explain differences in financial development well.  What general dif-
ferences there once were have greatly eroded.  Common law systems 
regulate and legislate, as do civil law nations.  Moreover, the function 
sought — investor protection specifically and property rights generally 
— can be achieved through multiple means.  Common law nations al-
ready have shifted many such functions to regulators like the SEC.  
Much of the work that could be done by the judge and fiduciary duties 
is now done by the legislature and regulators.  Most importantly, even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  160  See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD 
BANK RES. OBSERVER, Feb. 1998, at 1, 5. 
  161  That is, civil is to common law as rules are to standards.  For an analogous discussion of 
rules and standards, see Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 502, 508–09 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).  
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where judges do the job and do it well, they can only do so if the legis-
lature tolerates them. 
If legal origin is a weaker explanator than modern politics in the 
wealthy West, then the conditions are ripe for policy error: policymak-
ers enamored of the origins theory may prescribe institutional strate-
gies to developing and transition nations — such as denigrating public 
enforcement and overemphasizing private litigation — that might not 
work in their polities and might be less efficacious than alternative 
strategies. 
And the legal origins data are not as strong as they have seemed.  
Yes, origin predicts ownership separation in the wealthiest nations.   
But, using the same influential data set of twenty-seven rich nations 
that the legal origins literature has used, I show that indicators from 
the early twentieth century of economic destruction and national occu-
pation, as well as simple indicators of post–World War II legislative 
policy, are usually as strong or stronger than legal origins in predicting 
financial outcomes in the last half of the twentieth century.  Some na-
tions’ legislatures and polities have supported capital markets and 
some have not.  It’s not so much the type of institutions — the tools — 
that have counted in the world’s wealthier nations, but whether the 
nation has used them to support capital markets. 
If it’s preferences and interests interacting with political institutions 
that count, the sources for those preferences and interests are more 
likely to be found in modern history.  The political and social forces 
unleashed during the cataclysms of the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury — the World Wars’ devastation and economic collapse — are 
more plausible sources of many post–World War II polities’ aversion to 
robust financial markets than the distant subtleties of legal origin.   
The basic data are as consistent with World War–based and legislative 
policy–based explanations for differing financial markets as with a le-
gal origins–based explanation.  The fading in the last decade of key 
post–World War II financial effects in the wealthy West tells us that 
the differences in finance were probably local and temporal, arising 
not from persistent features embedded in legal origin but from differ-
ing postwar politics, policies, and economic tasks.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 9.  OWNERSHIP SEPARATION, AS PREDICTED 
BY SECURITIES LAW, LABOR POWER, 
AND LEGAL ORIGIN IN OECD NATIONS 
 
Dependent variable: ownership separation in large firms in 1995, n=23 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Securities 
regulation 
(disclosure) 
0.16 
(0.03) 
p<.001*** 
 
0.09 
(0.03) 
p=.008*** 
0.07 
(0.03) 
p=.05** 
0.09 
(0.03) 
p=.02** 
Labor power   
–0.64 
(0.07) 
p<.001*** 
–0.48 
(0.09) 
p<.001*** 
–0.36 
(0.14) 
p=.02** 
–0.43 
(0.07) 
p<.001*** 
Common law       
 
0.14 
(0.14) 
p=.35 
 
French  civil  law     
–0.08 
(0.05) 
p=.11 
GDP per capita 
1995  
0.01 
(0.005) 
p=.06 
0.01 
(0.006) 
p=.07 
0.01 
(0.004) 
p=.06 
0.01 
(0.004) 
p=.03** 
0.01 
(0.005) 
p=.23 
R2  0.57  0.73  0.82  0.84  0.84 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10, .05, and 
.01 levels, respectively 
 
Explanations for Table 9: 
Column (1) shows that securities regulation disclosure predicts 
ownership separation well and is highly significant statistically.  The 
second to last row, “GDP/capita 1995,” controls for a nation’s wealth.  
Column (2) shows that labor power predicts ownership separation just 
as nicely.  The last row, R2, shows it accounting (with national wealth) 
for about 73% of the variation in ownership separation.  Columns (3)–
(5) show that labor power is robust to securities regulation and legal 
origin in predicting ownership separation.  It retains statistical signifi-
cance.  However, since disclosure, labor power, and legal origin all cor-
relate (see Table 10), we cannot tell which factor most affects owner-
ship separation in large public firms.  The data show a story much 
more contestable than the academic finance literature on legal origin 
has it but do not end the discussion. 
The sample for Table 9 consists of the OECD nations for which 
there’s data.  The sample is nearly identical to the LLSV sample of 
twenty-seven nations that’s proven influential in supporting the legal 
origin theory.  See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the 
World, supra note 103, at 494.  Substituting the LLSV twenty-seven-
nation sample for the OECD one for the runs throughout this data 
Appendix yields substantially similar results.  In fact, using the origi- 
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nal LLSV sample (which includes four non-OECD nations) yields 
stronger results for a political economy theory, with securities disclo-
sure losing significance against labor power in columns (3)–(5).  (Re-
sults not published here, but available from the author.) 
 
TABLE 10.  SECURITIES POLICY, LEGAL ORIGIN, AND LABOR 
POLICY CORRELATE IN OECD NATIONS 
 
 
Common
law 
French
civil law
Securities 
disclosure 
GDP 
1945/1913 Occupied 
Total 
20th-century 
destruction 
French civil law  –0.45        
Securities disclosure  0.64 – 0.39      
GDP in 1945/1913   0.40 – 0.43  0.55      
Occupied –0.75  0.42 – 0.54 – 0.45    
Total 20th-century destruction  –0.65  0.50 – 0.64 – 0.89  0.80  
Total postwar labor power  –0.78  0.51 – 0.52 – 0.34  0.67  0.57 
 
Explanations for Table 10: 
The securities disclosure index counts up specific disclosures that a 
nation’s securities law requires a firm to deliver to stock buyers.  See 
supra note 88.  The term “GDP 1945/1913” roughly measures how 
poorly countries did during the first part of the twentieth century by 
constructing a ratio of their gross domestic products.  The United 
States grew during that period; its ratio of GDP in 1945 to that in 1913 
is about three.  In contrast, most Continental European nations did 
not grow and their ratios are just a little over one.  “Occupied” meas-
ures whether the country was militarily occupied at some point in the 
twentieth century or suffered a civil war.  The core common law coun-
tries were not occupied; most core civil countries were.  “Total 20th-
century destruction” combines the last two variables. 
The fractions tell us how strongly two factors correlate.  A 1 would 
mean the factors move perfectly in tandem.  If labor and securities had 
a correlation value of –1, for example, then when labor power was 
high, securities disclosure was low.  Labor power and securities disclo-
sure in fact correlate negatively (at –0.45).  I conjecture in the text (see 
supra pp. 488–91) that legislatures that promote one denigrate the 
other. 
“Common law” and “Occupied” correlate highly negatively (at 
–0.75); “French civil law” and “Occupied” correlate positively at 0.42. 
(Some civil law nations, such as Germany and the Scandinavian na-
tions, are not French civil law nations.) The modern finance literature 
focusing on legal origin in the world’s wealthiest nations may just be 
picking up whether the nation was occupied during the twentieth cen-
tury, namely whether it lacked institutional stability.  However, since 
the core explanatory possibilities — twentieth-century destruction, le- 
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gal origin, and postwar legislative policy — all correlate, we cannot 
easily say one is statistically more important than another. 
 
TABLE 11.  THE TWO WORLD WARS 
AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
 
Dependent variable: ownership separation in 1995, n=23 
 ( 1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP 1945/1913 
0.22 
(0.08) 
p=.01*** 
0.19 
(0.07) 
p=.02** 
0.09 
(0.05) 
p=.06** 
0.14 
(0.09) 
p=.17** 
Common law     
0.40 
(0.09) 
p<.001*** 
 
French civil law       
–0.23 
(0.11) 
p=.04** 
GDP/capita 1995    
0.01 
(0.008) 
p=.09 
0.01 
(0.006) 
p=.04** 
0.01 
(0.008) 
p=.44 
R2  0.30  0.37  0.76  0.51 
 
 
TABLE 12.  INVASION, OCCUPATION, AND REVOLUTION 
IN OECD NATIONS DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
Dependent variable: ownership separation in 1995, n=23 
 ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Occupation 
or 
revolution 
–0.41 
(0.09) 
p<.001*** 
–0.39 
(0.09) 
p<.001*** 
–0.13 
(0.13) 
p=.34 
–0.32 
(0.10) 
p=.003*** 
    
Total 
destruction 
in 20th 
century  
      
–0.18 
(0.03) 
p<.001*** 
–0.08 
(0.04) 
p=.07* 
–0.14 
(0.05) 
p=.005*** 
Common 
law    
0.34 
(0.15) 
p=.03** 
  
0.34 
(0.10) 
p=.004*** 
 
 
French civil 
law 
 
    
–0.14 
(0.07) 
p=.05** 
  
–0.15 
(0.09) 
p=.09* 
GDP/capita 
1995   
0.01 
(0.006) 
p=.12 
0.01 
(0.006) 
p=.05** 
0.01 
(0.007) 
p=.39 
0.01 
(0.007) 
p=.14 
0.01 
(0.005) 
p=.03** 
0.01 
(0.007) 
p=.41 
R2  0.59  0.63  0.74  0.67  0.58  0.77  0.63 
 
Explanations for Tables 11 and 12: 
Columns (1) and (2) show that economic collapse (Table 11) and 
military instability (Table 12) nicely predict late-twentieth-century 
ownership dispersion.  Columns (5), (6), and (7) run the same test, 
combining “Occupied” with “GDP1945/1913” to form “Total Destruc-
tion,” on the theory that some nations, although occupied, suffered lit-
tle economic damage, and other nations, even if not occupied, suffered  
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great damage.  Both factors, GDP change and occupation, get equal 
weight.  The results are about the same, with “Total Destruction” a 
good predictor of late-twentieth-century financial markets, even after 
accounting for the wealth destroyed, which is controlled for in the sec-
ond to last row via GDP per capita in 1995: equally rich nations in the 
1990s have differing financial markets, with those destroyed in the 
early part of the twentieth century having weaker financial markets 
than those that fared less badly. 
More work is done by the “Occupied” variable than by the GDP 
change variable.  Unreported results for World War II alone (the ratio 
of 1945 to 1935 GDP) are similar.  Again, running the same tests with 
LLSV’s original twenty-seven nations yields similar results.  Because 
“Common law” and “Occupied” correlate so highly (>0.7), the results in 
column (3) — with “Occupied” dominating in the LLSV sample but 
“Common law” dominating in the OECD sample — are not meaning-
ful.  They’re reported because of prior readers’ curiosity.  The data 
show a plausible case that something went on in the twentieth century 
that was more central to national governments and financial markets 
than legal origins and judicial style. 
 
TABLE 13.  INTERACTION OF WAR AND NATIONAL WEALTH 
 
Dependent variable: stock market capitalization/GDP in 1995; 
(1) OECD nations; (2)–(4) include those poorer nations for which there’s data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
n=30 
(all OECD 
nations) 
n=54 (includes those poorer nations 
for which there’s data) 
Occupation or 
revolution 
–0.32 
(0.11) 
p=.006*** 
–0.02 
(0.14) 
p=.91 
0.38 
(0.23) 
p=.11 
0.30 
(0.18) 
p=.10* 
0.35 
(0.21) 
p=.11 
OECD      
–0.21 
(0.25) 
p=41 
–0.28 
(0.24) 
p=.24 
–0.27 
(0.27) 
p=.31 
Interaction term: 
OECD × Occupied    
–0.69 
(0.25) 
p=.01*** 
–0.44 
(0.25) 
p=.09* 
–0.62 
(0.24) 
p=.01*** 
 
Common law 
 
    
–0.26 
(0.19) 
p=.17 
 
French civil law         
–0.12 
(.14) 
p=.39 
GDP/capita 1995 
0.04 
(0.01) 
p=.002*** 
0.02 
(0.01) 
p=.02** 
0.05 
(0.01) 
p<.001*** 
0.05 
(0.01) 
p<.001*** 
0.05 
(0.01) 
p<.001*** 
R2  0.58  0.09  0.38  0.41  0.39 
 
Explanations for Table 13: 
I focus in this article on political and international disruptions in 
the wealthy West, arguing that they are more important than nuances 
of legal origin in explaining the relative strength of financial markets.   
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That’s reflected in column (1): occupation, revolution, or violent civil 
war negatively predict strong securities markets, even after controlling 
for national wealth. 
In column (2), I add in poorer, non-OECD nations for which stock 
market size data exists, such as Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, 
and Nigeria.  (I would have used ownership concentration, but the bet-
ter data on ownership concentration is not available for the poorer, de-
veloping nations.)  When I add the developing nations into the mix, 
the predictive power of occupation, revolution, and violent civil war 
disappears.  The most plausible reason why this disappears is that war 
destroys institutions, but in nations where institutions are already de-
graded — as they are in many poorer nations — war does less relative 
institutional damage; that is, rich nations have much more institutional 
strength to lose in a war than do poor nations.  Columns (3)–(6) test 
this possibility.  I interact national wealth (via membership in the 
OECD) with the war variable by multiplying the two: if the nation is 
rich and was occupied or had a civil war, the variable takes on a value 
of 1.  If the nations is poor or did not suffer from war or civil turmoil 
in the twentieth century, the variable takes on a value of 0.  This in-
teraction is statistically significant, consistent with the rich having 
much more to lose than the poor.  It’s also consistent with the possibil-
ity I argued in this paper that political disruption (and its potential ef-
fect on post-disruption policy and politics) is likely to have a stronger 
effect than smaller institutions, such as legal origin. 
I add in the common law and civil law variables in columns (4) and 
(5).  The interaction does weaken against common law (which itself 
does not reach statistical significance), but the significance of the inter-
action term persists, and it also persists approximately intact against 
civil law, which isn’t significant in the last regression. 
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TABLE 14.  OWNERSHIP SEPARATION AND OCCUPATION 
 
Dependent 
variable   ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Number of 
observations  n=23 (OECD nations)  n=27 (also includes the 4 other nations for which 
there’s data, i.e., the full original LLSV sample) 
Occupation 
or revolution 
–0.39 
(0.09) 
p=.001*** 
–0.32 
(0.10) 
p=.003*** 
–0.38 
(0.08) 
p=.000*** 
–0.33 
(0.09) 
p=.002*** 
  
French civil 
law   
–0.14 
(0.07) 
p=.05** 
 
–0.14 
(0.06) 
p=.04** 
  
GDP/capita 
1995 
0.01 
(0.01) 
p=.12 
0.01 
(0.01) 
p=.39 
0.01 
(0.01) 
p=.09* 
0.00 
(0.01) 
p=.46 
  
Separation #1 
in 1995 
(measured by 
the number 
of 20% 
shareholders 
in the 20 
firms with a 
market 
capitalization 
just over 
$500 million)  R2  0.63  0.67  0.60  0.64    
Number of 
observations  n=24 (OECD nations)  n=44 (includes those poorer nations 
for which there’s data) 
Occupation 
or revolution 
0.09 
(0.05) 
p=.07* 
0.04 
(0.06) 
p=.51 
0.07 
(0.03) 
p=.04** 
0.06 
(0.03) 
p=.09* 
0.02 
(0.03) 
p=.54 
0.04 
(0.03) 
p=.14 
OECD        
–0.07 
(0.07) 
p=.29 
–0.06 
(0.06) 
p=.30 
Interaction 
term: 
OECD × 
Occupied 
    
0.07 
(0.06) 
p=.22 
0.01 
(0.06) 
p=.86 
French civil 
law   
0.12 
(0.08) 
p=.12 
 
0.10 
(0.03) 
p=.003*** 
 
0.11 
(0.04) 
p=.006*** 
GDP/capita 
1995 
–0.01 
(0.00) 
p=.01*** 
–0.01 
(0.01) 
p=.23 
–0.01 
(.00) 
p=.003*** 
0.00 
(0.00) 
p=.02** 
–0.01 
(0.00) 
p=.09* 
0.00 
(0.00) 
p=.41 
Separation #2 
in 1995 
(measured by 
size of 
holdings of 
3 largest 
shareholders 
in each of 10 
largest firms) 
R2  0.32  0.43  0.29  0.43  0.31  0.44 
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TABLE 15.  BLOCK PREMIUM, LABOR POWER, IPO DENSITY, 
NUMBER OF DOMESTIC FIRMS, PRIVATE DEBT-GNP RATIO 
 
 ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
(Wealthy, OECD nations only)  (Includes those poorer nations for which there’s data)   
Block premium: n=23 n=38 A 
Labor power: n=28 n=52 B 
IPOs per million citizens: n=22 n=40 C 
Domestic firms 
per million citizens: n = 24  n=48 D 
Dependent 
variable and 
number of 
observations 
Private debt/GNP: n=23 n=41 E 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.07)  A 
0.41 
(0.11)*** 
0.36 
(0.10)*** 
0.16 
(0.09)* 
0.16 
(0.08)* 
–0.18 
(0.11) 
–0.10 
(0.10)  B 
–1.29 
(0.54)** 
–1.18 
(0.58)* 
–0.29 
(0.42) 
–0.14 
(0.42) 
0.61 
(0.38) 
0.48 
(0.33)  C 
–16.94 
(7.70)** 
–12.96 
(7.69) 
–1.34 
(6.69) 
–.29 
(6.59) 
10.63 
(5.28)** 
8.29 
(5.86)  D 
Occupation or 
revolution 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
0.00 
(0.15)  E 
    0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08)  A 
     –0.18 
(0.15) 
–0.08 
(0.14)  B 
     –0.59 
(0.70) 
–0.69 
(0.73)  C 
     –16.50 
(14.03) 
–18.45 
(14.51)  D 
OECD  
    0.00 
(0.21) 
–0.03 
(0.18)  E 
    0.04 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.09)  A 
    0.58 
(0.16)*** 
0.44 
(0.14)***  B 
     –1.91 
(0.66)*** 
–1.51 
(0.67)**  C 
     –26.29 
(10.19)** 
–21.15 
(10.92)*  D 
Interaction 
term: OECD × 
Occupied 
     –0.01 
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.20)  E 
  0.01 
(0.09)    0.06 
(0.07)    0.06 
(0.07)  A 
  0.18 
(0.07)**    0.28 
(0.07)***    –0.22 
(0.05)***  B 
  –0.25 
(0.37)    –1.23 
(0.39)***    –0.65 
(0.31)**  C 
  –10.06 
(6.30)    –15.01 
(5.28)***    –6.91 
(4.46)  D 
French civil 
law 
  –0.14 
(0.15)*    –0.17 
(0.09)**    –0.19 
(0.10)**  E 
–0.01 
(0.00) *** 
–0.01 
(0.00)** 
–0.01 
(0.00)** 
–0.01 
(0.00) 
–0.01 
(0.00)* 
–0.01 
(0.00)  A 
–0.02 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00)** 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00)  B 
0.13 
(0.04)*** 
0.12 
(0.04)*** 
0.09 
(0.03)*** 
0.06 
(0.02)** 
0.17 
(0.04)*** 
0.15 
(0.04)***  C 
–0.97 
(0.50)* 
0.56 
(0.46) 
1.41 
(0.35)*** 
1.14 
(0.30)*** 
–2.92 
(0.77)*** 
2.72 
(0.78)***  D 
GDP/capita 
1995 
0.02 
(0.01)** 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)*** 
0.02 
(0.01)*** 
0.02 
(0.01)*** 
0.02 
(0.01)**  E 
0.32  0.32  0.15  0.18  0.18  0.20 A 
0.43  0.51  0.07  0.31  0.41  0.54 B 
0.46  0.47  0.22  0.35  0.51  0.54 C 
0.32  0.37  0.23  0.30  0.49  0.51 D 
R2 
0.21  0.24  0.31  0.38  0.31  0.38 E  
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Explanations for Tables 14 and 15: 
In Tables 14 and 15, I examine other national corporate finance 
outcomes for which there’s data: a second measure of ownership sepa-
ration, as well as block premium, labor power, the number of initial 
public offerings, the number of firms, and the total private debt to 
GNP ratio.  Block premium measures whether concentrated owners do 
much better than small outsiders when big blocks are sold — it’s a 
measure of how strongly the system protects outside shareholders.   
Labor power we’ve seen before.  The initial public offerings variable 
indicates how many private firms sell some of their stock to the public 
in a given year, scaled by the population of the nation.  The number of 
firms variable tells us how many corporations there are in the country.  
Total private debt tells us how much in debt has been issued in a 
country (divided by the size of nation’s economy).  All these are com-
monly-used measures of the strength of a nation’s financial markets. 
In these models, the “Occupied” variable is generally significant 
and usually robust to legal origin when run for the richer, OECD na-
tions.  But when we expand the sample to include poorer nations for 
which there’s sufficient financial data, the story is mixed, with the 
“Occupied” variable sometimes significant and sometimes not.  The in-
teraction term, “OECD × Occupied,” looks to see whether being occu-
pied is important to the financial outcome if the nation is a rich mem-
ber of the OECD.  That interaction term is significant for a majority 
(six of ten) of the outcomes in Table 15.  When significant, it’s not al-
ways robust to legal origin, which itself isn’t always significant. 
Table  15 shows the interaction effect for ownership separation.   
The better measure of ownership separation, which I used in the ear-
lier tables and discussion in the paper, is not available for a wide sam-
ple of nations.  (That better measure corrects for the size of companies 
in a nation by measuring separation in a sample of the twenty firms 
that have just over $500 million in market capitalization.)  Another 
measure, which looks at the ownership percentage of the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest firms in a nation is less good but avail-
able for more nations.  (It’s less good because larger nations would 
have larger firms, and larger firms typically need to raise capital more 
widely.)  For information purposes, Table 14 also shows results with 
the better measure of separation. 
Again, because common law origin correlates highly and negatively 
with being occupied (at just under 0.8) in these regressions, running 
“Common law” against “Occupied” is not meaningful.  “French civil 
law” correlates at about 0.42 with “Occupied.”  Because “Occupied” 
and “Common law” correlate so highly, we have here a plausible alter-
native explanation, although not one proven by the regressions. 
In Table 15, I show the extent to which “Occupation” correlates 
with other national financial outcomes beyond ownership separation 
and stock market capitalization.  In row A, I use block premium,  
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which measures how much more an insider gets than an outsider when 
selling his or her big block of stock.  “Occupied” does not predict block 
premium, as row A shows. 
Row B shows that “Occupied” strongly predicts “Labor Power” for 
the wealthy, OECD nations.  It loses significance in the larger sample 
that includes poorer nations, but the interaction term (measuring 
whether being militarily occupied is associated with enhanced postwar 
labor power in rich nations) is significant and robust to legal origin.  
The results in row B are important because, as I argue in the text, la-
bor power may be a primary conduit for, and reflection of, post–World 
War II politics and policy in the wealthy West.  Labor power itself 
predicts many postwar financial results. 
Row C shows that “Occupied” predicts the number of initial public 
offerings per capita for the wealthy, OECD nations and is robust to le-
gal origin (which itself is not significant).  The interaction term is sig-
nificant and robust to origin.  Row D shows similar robust results for 
the number of domestic firms per capita: interaction between “Occu-
pied” and OECD membership is significant and robust to origin.  In a 
result that I do not reproduce here, “Occupied” predicts the extent to 
which firms use external capital.  It’s robust to legal origin in the 
wealthy, OECD nations sample, and the interaction term is significant 
in the larger sample but not robust to origin. 
In row E, we see the extent to which “Occupied” predicts private 
debt in a nation.  (Private debt over GNP measures the ratio of the 
sum of private sector bank debt and bonds to GNP.)  While “Occu-
pied” is not significant, the principal politics-based theories wouldn’t 
predict it to be in the wealthy West: one would expect the occupied na-
tions, with a polity stunned by war, to seek stability by using more 
debt, especially debt with governance rights, than the non-occupied 
nations.  They do, as the positive sign of the interaction term indicates. 
Overall, the salient factors of twentieth-century history — those 
that would contribute to institutional instability and deeply affect 
postwar polities — do about as well as legal origin in explaining dif-
ferences in national financial outcomes statistically for the wealthy 
West.  And, as I show in the text, they do much better qualitatively. 
 
SOURCE LIST FOR VARIABLES 
 
Ownership separation in 1995: 
La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 103, at 494 tbl.III. 
 
Securities disclosure: 
La Porta et al, What Works?, supra note 19. 
 
Stock market capitalization-to-debt: 
La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 17, at 1138 tbl.II (tabulating 
debt  as  a  percentage  of  a  nation’s  GDP);  The  World  Bank  Group,  WDI  Online,  http://              
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publications.worldbank.org/WDI (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (providing World Development Indi-
cators (WDI) and showing stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP). 
 
Total postwar labor power: 
Botero et al, The Regulation of Labor, supra note 7, at 1362–64 tbl.III (constructing an employ-
ment laws index and collective relations laws index).  I sum these two indices to yield “Total La-
bor Power.” 
 
Common law and French civil law: 
La Porta et al., What Works?, supra note 19. 
 
GDP 1945 over GDP 1913: 
Angus Maddison, World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1–2003 AD (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/. 
 
Total twentieth-century destruction: 
Calculate [GDP 1945/1913 – Occupied], then multiply by (–1), so the intuition would be that a 
higher value corresponds to greater destruction, and add 6.8 to shift all the data points to above 0. 
 
Occupied or revolution status: 
THE STATESMAN’S YEARBOOK, supra note 111. 
 
1995 GDP per capita and stock market capitalization per GDP in 1995: 
The World Bank Group, supra. 
 
Ownership separation measure 2 in 1995: 
The World Bank Group, supra. 
 
Block premium for the 1990s: 
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. 
FIN. 537, 551 tbl.II (2004). 
 
External capitalization over GNP, the number of domestic firms per million capita, IPOs per mil-
lion capita in 1994, and debt per GNP in 1994 or last available year: 
La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 17, at 1138–39 tbl.II. 
 